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In microprocessors, achieving an efficient utilization of the execution units is a key factor
in improving performance. However, maintaining an uninterrupted flow of instructions is
a challenge due to the data and control dependencies between instructions of a program.
Modern microprocessors employ aggressive optimizations trying to keep their execution
units busy without violating inter-instruction dependencies. Such complex optimizations
may cause subtle implementation flaws that can be hard to detect using conventional
simulation-based verification techniques.
Formal verification is known for its ability to discover design flaws that may go unde-
tected using conventional verification techniques. However, with formal verification come
two major challenges. First, the correctness of the implementation needs to be defined
formally. Second, formal verification is often hard to apply at the scale of realistic imple-
mentations.
In this thesis, we present a formal verification strategy to guarantee that a micropro-
cessor implementation preserves both data and control dependencies among instructions.
Throughout our strategy, we address the two major challenges associated with formal
verification: correctness and scalability.
We address the correctness challenge by specifying our correctness in the context of
generic pipelines. Unlike conventional pipeline hazard rules, we make no distinction be-
tween the data and control aspects. Instead, we describe the relationship between a pro-
ducer instruction and a consumer instruction in a way such that both instructions can
speculatively read their source operands, speculatively write their results, and go out of
their program order during execution. In addition to supporting branch and value pre-
diction, our correctness criteria allow the implementation to discard (squash) or replay
instructions while being executed.
We address the scalability challenge in three ways: abstraction, decomposition, and
induction. First, we state our inter-instruction dependency correctness criteria in terms
of read and write operations without making reference to data values. Consequently, our
correctness criteria can be verified for implementations with abstract datapaths. Second,
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we decompose our correctness criteria into a set of smaller obligations that are easier to
verify. All these obligations can be expressed as properties within the Syntactically-Safe
fragment of Linear Temporal Logic (SSLTL). Third, we introduce a technique to verify
SSLTL properties by induction, and prove its soundness and completeness.
To demonstrate our overall strategy, we verified a term-level model of an out-of-order
speculative processor. The processor model implements register renaming using a P6-style
reorder buffer and branch prediction with a hybrid (discard-replay) recovery mechanism.
The verification obligations (expressed in SSLTL) are checked using a tool implementing
our inductive technique. Our tool, named Tahrir, is built on top of a generic interface to
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In microprocessors, achieving an efficient utilization of the execution units is a key factor
in improving performance. However, maintaining an uninterrupted flow of instructions is
a challenge due to the data and control dependencies between instructions of a program.
Modern microprocessors employ aggressive optimizations trying to keep their execution
units busy without violating inter-instruction dependencies. Such complex optimizations
may cause subtle implementation bugs that can be hard to detect using conventional
simulation-based verification techniques.
It was estimated that if a bug similar to the Pentium FDIV bug∗ were to go undetected
in the Intel R© Pentium R© 4 processor, it would cost Intel $12 Billion [5]. Such devastating
economic effect motivates the use of formal verification approaches. Formal verification is
known for its ability to discover design flaws that may not be detected using conventional
verification techniques. The power of formal verification approaches lies in their exhaustive
nature which enables detecting any violation of the processor specifications early in the
design phase.
Formal verification is the act of using mathematical methods in proving or disproving
the correctness of an implementation with respect to a certain specification. In the context
∗Floating point Division (FDIV) bug, discovered in 1994, resulted in Intel’s first ever chip-recall and a
charge against earnings of $475 million.
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of hardware systems, the term implementation refers to a design description at any level
of the hardware abstraction hierarchy, not only the final circuit layout [21]. The term
specification refers to the desired (correct) behavior of the design under consideration.
The most common techniques used in formal verification are:
• Theorem Proving : the implementation/specification relationship is treated as a the-
orem to be proved in the context of a proof calculus. Theorem proving tools, such
as HOL [20] and ACL2 [30, 31], are used to guarantee the soundness of verification
proofs. Human intervention is required to guide the verification.
• Model Checking : the verification is typically done by performing an exhaustive search
over the implementation state-space. Model-checking tools, such as SMV [43] and
FormalCheck [36], carry out such exhaustive searches automatically in order to min-
imize human intervention. Fully-automated model-checking techniques do not scale
well with an increase in the size of the implementation and/or specification; this is
known as the state-space explosion problem. Other model-checking techniques (e.g.,
invariant-based) trade full-automation for scalability. For instance, with invariant-
based model checking, such as in UCLID [6], the human verifier has to identify the
invariants of the implementation, which is something done automatically in SMV for
example.
Specifications can be formally represented either by a high-level model or by a set
of properties [32]. In the first case, the verification goal is to make sure that all of the
possible implementation behaviors are a subset of the specification behaviors; this is called
refinement-based verification. In the second case, the verification goal is to make sure that
all of the possible implementation behaviors satisfy the specification properties; this is
called assertion-based verification.
With formal verification come two major challenges. First, the correctness of the im-
plementation needs to be defined formally. Second, formal verification is often hard to
apply at the scale of realistic implementations. To date, a fully-automatic verification of a
realistic microprocessor is well beyond the capacity of any known formal verification tool.
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This represents an open area for future improvements highly motivated by real industrial
needs.
In this thesis, we present a formal verification strategy to guarantee that a micropro-
cessor implementation preserves both data and control dependencies among instructions.
Throughout our strategy, we address the two major challenges associated with formal
verification: correctness and scalability.
We address the correctness challenge by specifying our correctness in the context of
generic pipelines. Unlike conventional pipeline hazard rules, we make no distinction be-
tween the data and control aspects. Instead, we describe the relationship between two
arbitrary instructions, first of which produces some data that should be consumed by the
other, in such a way that both instructions can speculatively read their source operands,
speculatively write their results, and go out of their program order during execution. In
addition to supporting branch and value prediction, our correctness criteria allow the im-
plementation to discard (squash) or replay instructions while being executed.
We address the scalability challenge in three ways: abstraction, decomposition, and
induction. First, we state our inter-instruction dependency correctness criteria in terms
of read and write operations without making reference to data values. Consequently, our
correctness criteria can be verified for implementations with abstract datapaths, which
reduces the verification complexity and enables verifying larger implementations. Second,
we decompose our correctness criteria into a set of smaller obligations that are easier to
verify. All these obligations can be expressed as properties within the syntactically-safe
fragment of linear temporal logic (SSLTL). Third, we introduce a technique to verify SSLTL
properties by induction, and prove its soundness and completeness.
To check whether an implementation satisfies an SSLTL property, we first compile the
formula into a non-deterministic Büchi automaton. Then, we augment the implementation
with a set of history variables representing the states of the Büchi automaton and generate
an invariant representing the automaton’s transition relation. Finally, we check whether
the augmented implementation satisfies the invariant for both the base and inductive cases.
To demonstrate our overall strategy, we verified a term-level model of an out-of-order
speculative processor. The processor model implements register renaming using a P6-style
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reorder buffer and branch prediction with a hybrid (discard-replay) recovery mechanism.
The verification obligations (expressed in SSLTL) are checked using a tool, named Tahrir,
implementing our inductive technique. Tahrir is built on top of a generic interface to
SMT solvers and can be generally used for verifying SSLTL properties about infinite-state
systems.
1.1 Thesis Contributions
This thesis contains two major areas of research: verification of SSLTL properties on
infinite-state systems, and the specification and verification of inter-instruction dependen-
cies in microprocessors.
Our overall goal was to verify the correctness of microarchitectural algorithms. For this
reason, we chose to use term-level models of microprocessors. Term-level models would
allow us to focus on algorithms and not get lost in low-level hardware details.
The most natural approach for specifying correctness was to use LTL. In fact, all of our
properties can be easily expressed in a fragment of LTL called “syntactically-safe LTL”
(SSLTL), which is easier to verify compared to full LTL.
To accomplish this verification, we needed an effective approach for verifying SSLTL
properties about term-level models. Verification of LTL properties generally is done by
reachability analysis. Term-level models are infinite-state systems. Since reachability anal-
ysis will not terminate on infinite-state systems, our solution was to create an inductive
approach that uses manually constructed invariants to restrict the state space. This ap-
proach made it possible for us to verify SSLTL properties about infinite-state systems.
Though the SAL verification suite [15] has similar capabilities, the benefits of our work
are a clearly documented algorithm with proof of correctness and a tool with a generic
interface to SMT solver engines.
The conventional approach to the formal verification of a microprocessor is to construct
a single, monolithic, correctness criterion. The verification relies on lemmas and invariants
that are defined on a case-by-case basis for each pipeline. The conventional approach looks
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at a state of the pipeline, which is problematic because the large number of in-flight parcels
causes capacity problems in verification.
Our work provides a general definition of correctness and a general verification strat-
egy that decomposes the top-level correctness statement into simpler obligations about
data/control dependencies between parcels on individual variables. Our approach saves
the effort and potential mistakes of creating custom definitions of correctness and verifica-
tion strategies for each pipeline.
1.2 Thesis Outline
Chapter 2 explains our approach for the formal verification of SSLTL formulas. It describes
the overall verification algorithm and shows its correctness. Chapter 3 switches the focus
to the inter-parcel (instruction) correctness criteria and their decomposition. Chapter 4
sheds some light on the case study used to evaluate/illustrate the techniques presented in
chapters 2 and 3. Chapter 5 summarizes the research presented in this thesis and offers
some directions for future work.
5
Chapter 2
Inductive Verification of SSLTL
The first step in verifying a reactive system is to come up with a formal specification of
the system. One of the common specification languages for reactive systems is temporal
logic. Temporal logic comes in two varieties: linear time (e.g., linear temporal logic (LTL)
[51]) or branching time (e.g., computational tree logic (CTL) [10]). The difference is that
branching time logics can reason about multiple time lines while linear time logics are
restricted to a single time line.
The ability to reason about more than one time line may suggest that branching time
logics would be superior. However, other factors such as expressiveness, efficiency and
intuitiveness need to be taken into consideration when choosing between the two classes of
logic. For instance, neither CTL or LTL is more expressive than the other, and although
CTL is more efficient (in terms of model-checking complexity), in practice, engineers found
it easier to specify properties in LTL [62].
In this research, it was more intuitive for us to use LTL in specifying the inter-instruction
dependency properties in chapter 3. Another factor favoring LTL was that all our properties
could be expressed using a fragment of LTL called the syntactically-safe linear temporal
logic (SSLTL), whose model-checking complexity is less than that of full LTL.
In this chapter, we focus on SSLTL. We provide the necessary background and demon-
strate the related work in section 2.1. Then, in section 2.2, we introduce an algorithm that
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allows us to check SSLTL properties about infinite-state systems inductively. We show the
soundness and completeness of our algorithm in section 2.3. We conclude the chapter with
a few remarks in section 2.4. A summary of the chapter can be found in section 2.5.
2.1 Background and Related Work
The goal of this section is to provide enough background information to help the reader
understand the SSLTL verification strategy we describe in section 2.2. We start by defining
two computational models: state transition systems (subsection 2.1.1) and Büchi automata
(subsection 2.1.2). Then, we define the linear temporal logic and its syntactically-safe
fragment SSLTL (subsection 2.1.3). Last, we conclude by demonstrating some of the work
done on LTL verification (subsection 2.1.4).
2.1.1 State Transition Systems
A state transition system (STS) is a graph that enumerates all the states of a reactive
system and describes the relationship between these states. Each state in an STS is labeled
by the propositions that hold in this state. The computations of the original system are
modeled as paths in the STS. We formally define an STS as follows:
Definition 2.1. (STS) A state transition system T is a five tuple T = 〈AP, S, I, R, L〉
where:
• AP is a set of atomic propositions.
• S is a (possibly infinite) set of states.
• I ⊆ S is the set of initial states.
• R ⊆ S × S is a total transition relation. R is total in the sense that for each s ∈ S,
there exists s′ ∈ S such that R(s, s′).
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• L : S 7→ 2AP is a labeling function that identifies the true atomic propositions∗ in
each state.
Example 2.1. The graph in figure 2.1 represents a state transition system T = 〈AP, S, I, R, L〉
where:
• AP = {a, b, c}
• S = {s0, s1, s2}
• I = {s0}
• R = {(s0, s0), (s0, s1), (s0, s2), (s1, s2), (s2, s0)}







Figure 2.1: An example of a state transition system (STS)
A path in a state transition system T = 〈AP, S, I, R, L〉 is an infinite sequence of states
π =≪π0π1π2 . . .≫ where R(πi, πi+1) for all i ∈ N. We refer to the suffix of π starting at
a state πj, for some j ∈ N, as ~πj. A run of T is a path π1 that starts from an initial state
(i.e., π01 ∈ I). On that basis, we define the following concepts:
∗A proposition is a statement that is either true or false. Atomic propositions are those propositions
which cannot be represented in terms of other propositions.
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Definition 2.2. (STS Concepts) Given a state transition system T = 〈AP, S, I, R, L〉:
• The set of all possible runs of T is:
Runs(T ) = {π | π0 ∈ I ∧ ∀ i ∈ N. R(πi, πi+1)}
• The set of reachable states of T is:
Reach(T ) = {s | ∃ π ∈ Runs(T ), i ∈ N. s = πi}
• The language of T is:
Lang(T ) = {ω | ∃ π ∈ Runs(T ). ∀ i ∈ N. ωi = L(πi)}
• The language of T restricted to a set AP ′ is:
LangAP
′
(T ) = {ω | ∃ π ∈ Runs(T ). ∀ i ∈ N. ωi = L(πi) ∩ AP ′}
Notice that, in definition 2.2, the language of T consists of a set of words. Each word
is a sequence of letters. Each letter is a set of atomic propositions.
Next, we present the concept of simulation [45] as a means of comparing the behavior
of state transition systems.
Definition 2.3. (Simulation) Let T1 = 〈AP1, S1, I1, R1, L1〉 and T2 = 〈AP2, S2, I2, R2, L2〉
be two state transition systems. We say T2 simulates T1 (denoted as T1  T2) if and only
if:
AP2 ⊆ AP1
∧ ∃H ⊆ S1 × S2. ∀ s1.
s1 ∈ I1 =⇒ ∃ s2 ∈ I2. H(s1, s2)
∧ ∀ s2. H(s1, s2) =⇒ L1(s1) ∩ AP2 = L2(s2)
∧ ∀ s2, s
′
1. H(s1, s2) ∧ R1(s1, s
′










A Büchi automaton (BA) [7] is a finite automaton that accepts infinite input sequences
(i.e., an ω-automaton). An input sequence is accepted if and only if the automaton visits
a subset of certain states (called accepting states) infinitely often during its run. Büchi
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automata are either deterministic or non-deterministic. Throughout this thesis, the term
“Büchi automata” is used to refer to non-deterministic Büchi automata.
A simple example of a Büchi automaton is shown in figure 2.2. This automaton is
non-deterministic because for instance when the automaton reaches state q1, it is possible
to accept input literals a and b, and non-deterministically choose to stay at q1 or move to
q0. Conventionally, Büchi automata are defined as follows:
Definition 2.4. (BA) A Büchi automaton B is a five tuple B = 〈Σ, Q, q̇,∆, F 〉 where:
• Σ is a finite set of characters (input alphabet).
• Q is a finite set of states.
• q̇ ∈ Q is the initial state.
• ∆ ⊆ Q × Σ × Q is a total transition relation. Totality here means that for every
q ∈ Q, there exists q′ ∈ Q and σ ∈ Σ such that ∆(q, σ, q′).
• F ⊆ Q is the set of accepting states.
Notice that the input alphabet Σ can be defined to be the power set of a set of atomic
propositions. In this case, every character is a subset of the atomic propositions, and
should be interpreted as the conjunction of those atomic propositions.
Example 2.2. Suppose q1 is the only accepting state of the Büchi automaton shown in
figure 2.2. In this case, the automaton can be represented by a five tuple 〈Σ, Q, q̇,∆, F 〉
where:
• Σ = 2{a,b}
• Q = {q0, q1}
• q̇ = q0








Figure 2.2: An example of a Büchi automaton
• F = {q1}
In this thesis, we are interested in the subset of Büchi automata where every state is an
accepting state†. This is mainly because in our SSLTL verification approach, we translate
the properties into automata within that subset. Throughout the rest of the thesis, for
brevity, we will drop the set of final states from the tuple representing Büchi automata in
definition 2.4.
Similar to state transition systems in subsection 2.1.1, we define a run of a Büchi
automaton B = 〈Σ, Q, q̇,∆〉 as an infinite sequence of states π =≪ π0π1π2 . . .≫ that
starts from the initial state (i.e., π0 = q̇) and there exists a corresponding input sequence
σ =≪ σ0σ1σ2 . . .≫ such that ∆(πi, σi, πi+1) for all i ∈ N. We also define the following
concepts:
Definition 2.5. (BA Concepts) If B = 〈Σ, Q, q̇,∆〉 is a Büchi automaton, then:
• The set of all possible runs of B is:
Runs(B) = {π | π0 = q̇ ∧ ∀ i ∈ N. ∃ σi ∈ Σ. ∆(πi, σi, πi+1)}
†Of course this does not necessarily mean that the automaton accepts everything. Based on the tran-
sition relation, some inputs may not be accepted at certain states.
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• The language of B is:
Lang(B) = {ω | ∃ π ∈ Runs(B). ∀ i ∈ N. ∆(πi, ωi, πi+1)}
We also introduce the function BAtoSTS to syntactically transform Büchi automata to
state transition systems, where every state in the automaton is represented with (possibly)
multiple states in the STS, one state for each outgoing transition:
Definition 2.6. (BA to STS) Function BAtoSTS takes a Büchi automatonB = 〈2AP
′
, Q, q̇,∆〉
and returns a state transition system T = 〈AP, S, I, R, L〉 such that:
• AP = AP ′
• S = {(Z, σ) | Z ⊆ Q ∧ σ ⊆ AP ′ ∧
∃ q ∈ Z, q′ ∈ Q, σx ⊆ σ. ∆(q, σx, q
′)}
• I = {({q̇}, σ) | ({q̇}, σ) ∈ S}
• R = {((Z, σ), (Z ′, σ′)) | (Z, σ) ∈ S ∧ (Z ′, σ′) ∈ S ∧
Z ′ = {q′ | ∃ q ∈ Z, σx ⊆ σ. ∆(q, σx, q
′)}}
• L = λ (Z, σ). σ
2.1.3 Linear Temporal Logic (LTL)
Formal verification generally addresses properties with a temporal nature such as: “some-
thing eventually happens” or “something never happens”. Many temporal logics are used
for specifying such properties. We focus in this section on the Linear Temporal Logic
(LTL) [51], and more specifically, a fragment of it named syntactically-safe LTL (SSLTL).
Examples of other temporal logics are computational tree logics (CTL*, CTL and their
sublogics) [10] and µ-Calculus [34].
We start by introducing the syntax of LTL. The syntax is presented in Backus Naur
Form (BNF).
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Definition 2.7. (LTL Syntax) The syntax of LTL formulas can be inductively described
as follows:
φ ::= ⊤ | ⊥ | x | (¬φ) | (φ ∨ φ) | (φ ∧ φ) | (X φ) | (φ U φ) | (φ R φ)
where x is any atomic proposition
In addition to regular Boolean constants and operators: True (⊤), False (⊥), Negation
(¬), Disjunction (∨) and Conjunction (∧), LTL syntax introduces three temporal operators :
“Next” (X), “Until” (U), and “Release” (R). Some other Boolean and temporal operators
can be defined as syntactic sugar. Here are some examples:
• “Implies” (=⇒): p1 =⇒ p2 ≡ ¬p1 ∨ p2
• “Eventually” (F): F p ≡ ⊤ U p
• “Globally” (G): G p ≡ ⊥ R p
• “Weak Until” (W): p1 W p2 ≡ p2 R (p1 ∨ p2)
The semantics of LTL formulas are defined over the paths of a state transition system
as follows:
Definition 2.8. (LTL Semantics) Suppose π is a path in a state transition system T =
〈AP, S, I, R, L〉. Let x be one of the atomic propositions in AP . We define the LTL
satisfaction relation |= such that:
1. T, π |= ⊤.
2. ¬(T, π |= ⊥).
3. T, π |= x ⇐⇒ x ∈ L(π0).
4. T, π |= ¬p1 ⇐⇒ ¬(T, π |= p1).
5. T, π |= p1 ∨ p2 ⇐⇒ T, π |= p1 ∨ T, π |= p2.
13
6. T, π |= p1 ∧ p2 ⇐⇒ T, π |= p1 ∧ T, π |= p2.
7. T, π |= X p1 ⇐⇒ T, ~π
1 |= p1.
8. T, π |= p1 U p2 ⇐⇒ ∃ i ∈ N. T, ~π
i |= p2 ∧ ∀ j : 0 ≤ j < i. T, ~π
j |= p1.
9. T, π |= p1 R p2 ⇐⇒ ∀ i ∈ N. T, ~π
i |= p2 ∨ ∃ j < i. T, ~π
j |= p1.
As a generalization of definition 2.8, we say that a system T satisfies a property p
(written T |= p) if and only if p is satisfied in every run of T . More formally:
T |= p ⇐⇒ ∀ π ∈ Runs(T ). T, π |= p
Two of the most important classes of properties that can be specified in LTL (or in
Temporal Logics in general) are: safety properties and liveness properties. A safety prop-
erty asserts that something (bad) never happens, while a liveness property asserts that
something (good) eventually happens. All LTL properties in positive normal form (i.e.,
negation is restricted to atomic propositions) constructed with the temporal operators X
andR are safety properties [57, 35]. This class of LTL is referred to as the syntactically-safe
linear temporal logic, or simply SSLTL.
The basic syntax of SSLTL is similar to that of definition 2.7 except that the negation
is restricted to atomic propositions and the temporal operator U is not allowed. Only
formulas in positive normal form can be constructed using the basic syntax. For better
readability, we use the more flexible (yet equivalent) SSLTL syntax in definition 2.9.
Definition 2.9. (SSLTL Syntax) The SSLTL syntax is presented as follows:
φ ::= ⊤ | ⊥ | x | (¬φ̄) | (φ ∨ φ) | (φ ∧ φ) | (φ̄ =⇒ φ) | (X φ) | (φ R φ) | (G φ) | (φ W φ)
where:
φ̄ ::= ⊤ | ⊥ | x | (¬φ) | (φ̄ ∨ φ̄) | (φ̄ ∧ φ̄) | (φ =⇒ φ̄) | (X φ̄) | (φ̄ U φ̄) | (F φ̄)
x is any atomic proposition
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The syntax described in definition 2.9 does not allow an even number of negations to
be applied to U or any other operator built on top of it (as syntactic sugar), i.e., F. The
syntax also prevents an odd number of negations to be applied to R or any other operator
built on top of it, i.e., G and W. These two restrictions ensure the formula is kept within
the safe fragment of LTL.
In section 2.2, we present an algorithm for verifying SSLTL properties inductively.
We use SSLTL to specify the verification obligations in chapter 3. In that chapter, we
also use some Past linear temporal logic (PLTL) operators such as (e.g., “Past Next” X̂,
“Past Globally” Ĝ, and “Past Until” Û) in specifying some intermediate proof obligations.
These operators do not add expressive power to LTL [16]. However, they can help keep the
properties compact and easier to read. The semantics of these PLTL operators are similar
to their LTL counterparts except that they address past time as opposed to future time.
2.1.4 LTL Verification
In this section, we discuss the most common techniques for model checking linear temporal
logic (LTL). The aim of these techniques is to check whether an implementation T (modeled
as an STS for instance) satisfies a property p (specified in LTL), i.e., to check whether
T |= p. To be able to answer this question, p is compiled into a structure in the form
of a graph (namely, a tableau or an automaton) which then can be compared against the
implementation.
In the tableau-based approach, first the property p is used to build a tableau which is
a graph (or simply an STS) that contains every path that satisfies p. Then, the tableau
is composed with the implementation and the product is checked for paths that violate
p. The algorithms by Lichtenstein et al. [38] and Clarke et al. [11] are two examples of
the Tableau-based approach. In the first algorithm, the tableau construction is implicit
while in the second the tableau is directly constructed and symbolically represented as an
Ordered Binary Decision Diagram (OBDD).
The automata-based approach relies on the close relationship between LTL and Au-
tomata Theory which was first discussed by Wolper et al. [65]. Later work [63] showed
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that for any given LTL property p, it is possible to construct a finite automaton Bp on
infinite words that accepts exactly the set of computations that satisfy the property p.
By treating the implementation system T as an automaton, the problem of checking
whether T |= p is transformed into an equivalent language containment problem of whether
Lang(T ) ⊆ LangBp.
In practice, the language containment problem is solved by checking whether Lang(T ) ∩
Lang(B¬p) = ∅. The first step in implementing this approach is to construct a Büchi
automaton B¬p for the negation of the property p. Next, a product T × B¬p, whose
language equals the intersection between Lang(T ) and Lang(B¬p), is computed. The last
step is to check whether the language of the product T × B¬p is empty using techniques
based on either performing a nested depth-first search [13, 24] or computing the maximal
strongly connected components of a directed graph [58]. The property p is satisfied by the
implementation T if and only if Lang(T × B¬p) turns out to be empty.
The algorithm proposed by Gerth et al. [18] is an example of how an LTL property p is
compiled into a Generalized‡ Büchi automaton. The algorithm constructs the automaton
by incrementally building a graph of nodes. Individual nodes are recursively expanded,
split, or replaced to satisfy the subformulas of p. For representing the nodes, the algorithm
uses a data structure that keeps track of which subformulas have been processed so far as
well as which are left to be processed. After building the graph, the algorithm identifies the
accepting states based on the nodes that are marked with subformulas of the form φ1 U φ2.
Better performing algorithms for constructing Büchi automata from LTL properties were
developed by Couvreur [14], Gastin et al. [17], and Latvala [37].
In this thesis, we are interested in verifying properties specified using the syntactically-
safe fragment of LTL (SSLTL) defined in subsection 2.1.3. Kupferman and Vardi [35]
showed that for this subclass of LTL, the automaton B¬p does not have to recognize all
computations violating the property of p. Consequently, B¬p can be computed using a
more efficient approach involving the construction of an automaton on finite words. Also
in the case of SSLTL, checking language emptiness for the product T × B¬p is reduced to
‡A Generalized Büchi automaton (GBA) is defined the same as a regular Büchi automaton except that
a GBA can have multiple sets of accepting states. A word is recognized by a GBA if and only if at least
one state from every accepting set is visited infinitely often.
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invariance checking as opposed to checking cycles in the case of LTL.
In our strategy, we first construct a Büchi automaton Bp for the SSLTL property p itself
as opposed to its negation. Then through induction, we verify that the product system
satisfies an invariant about the states of Bp. For constructing Bp, we follow a straight-
forward approach based on that of Gerth et al. [18]. The difference is that in our case all
the states of Bp are considered accepting states since p is syntactically-safe. The details of
our strategy can be found in section 2.2.
2.2 SSLTL Verification Algorithm
In this section, we introduce an algorithm for verifying SSLTL properties inductively. The
algorithm takes (among other inputs) a model and an SSLTL property, and returns true if
and only if the model satisfies the property. The algorithm also takes a number representing
the depth of the induction and a Boolean expression to use in strengthening the inductive
invariant.
Before describing our algorithm, we first define what we mean by a model. The word
“model” refers to the source code of the system. Although models are finite in size, they
may describe infinite-state and/or non-deterministic systems. The purpose of a model is
to represent the behavior of a system using a set of variables and expressions over those
variables. The variables capture the state of the system and the expressions describe how
the state evolves over time. A model is formally defined as follows:
Definition 2.10. (Model) Let E be a set of expressions defined by a given grammar. A
Model M over E is a quadruple M = 〈V, Ȧ, Ä, Ā〉 where:
• V is a finite set of variables over possibly infinite domains.
• Ȧ ⊆ V × E is the set of initial-state assignments.
• Ä ⊆ V × E is the set of next-state assignments.
• Ā ⊆ V × E is a set of combinational assignments.
17
Example 2.3. The state transition system T in example 2.1 can be encoded by a model
M = 〈V, Ȧ, Ä, Ā〉 where:
• V = {s, a, b, c}
• Ȧ = {(s, S0)}
• Ä = {(s, if s = S0 then S0|S1|S2 elseif s = S1 then S2 else S0)}
• Ā = {(a, s = S0 ∨ s = S2), (b, s = S2), (c, s = S0 ∨ s = S1)}
For the remainder of this section (subsections 2.2.1-2.2.9), we present the set of functions
used in our algorithm where the main function, called Verify , is presented last.
2.2.1 Translating SSLTL into Büchi Automata (SSLTLtoBA)
Function SSLTLtoBA compiles an SSLTL property into a Büchi automaton. The func-
tion implements the basic Büchi automata construction algorithm by Gerth et al. [18]
(described in subsection 2.1.4), with the exception that all the states of the constructed
automaton are considered accepting states.
Example 2.4. For an SSLTL property p = G (a W (X b)), the corresponding Büchi
automaton B = SSLTLtoBA(p) is shown in figure 2.2.
2.2.2 Converting Büchi Automata to Models (BAtoModel)
The purpose of function BAtoModel is to generate a model from a Büchi automaton B.
Every state in the automaton is represented by a Boolean (state) variable in the generated
model. The variable associated with the initial state of the automaton is initialized to 1
while all the other variables are initialized to 0 (line 7). The next values of the variables are
defined as Boolean expressions encoding the transition relation of the automaton (line 9).
The automaton is completely represented by the state variables and hence no combinational
variables are added to the generated model.
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Function BAtoM(B : BA)





foreach q ∈ Q do5
ein := 0;6
if q = q̇ then Ȧ := Ȧ ∪ {(q, 1)} else Ȧ := Ȧ ∪ {(q, 0)};7
foreach (q1, σ1, q2) ∈ ∆ do8
if q = q2 then ein := ein ∨ q1 ∧ σ1;9
end10
Ä := Ä ∪ {(q, ein)};11
end12
return 〈V, Ȧ, Ä, Ā〉;13
Example 2.5. If the automaton generated in example 2.2 is to be passed to function
BAtoModel , the function would return a model M = 〈V, Ȧ, Ä, Ā〉 where:
• V = {q0, q1}
• Ȧ = {(q0, 1), (q1, 0)}
• Ä = {(q0, (q0 ∧ a) ∨ (q1 ∧ a ∧ b)), (q1, q0 ∨ (q1 ∧ b))}
§
• Ā = {}
2.2.3 Generating Invariants from Büchi Automata (BAtoInvar)
Function BAtoInvar produces a Boolean expression describing the states and transitions of
a Büchi automaton B. The output Boolean expression is a conjunction of a set of clauses.
§Symbols a and b are free variables.
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Each clause encodes a single state (as a Boolean variable) and all its outgoing transitions
(as a Boolean expression). The generated Boolean expression can be true if and only if at
least one state and one transition going out of it are satisfied.
Function BAtoI(B : BA)
Define: 〈Σ, Q, q̇,∆〉 ≡ B
e := 0;1
foreach q ∈ Q do2
eout := 0;3
foreach (q1, σ1, q2) ∈ ∆ do4
if q = q1 then eout := eout ∨ σ1;5
end6
e := e ∨ q ∧ eout;7
end8
return e;9
Example 2.6. The invariant generated by function BAtoInvar for the automaton from
example 2.2 is:
e = (q0 ∧ (a ∨ True)) ∨ (q1 ∧ (b ∨ (a ∧ b))) = q0 ∨ (q1 ∧ b)
2.2.4 Combining Models (MergeM )
As its name suggests, function MergeM combines two models M1 and M2 into one. This is
done simply by constructing the union between each component from model M1 with the
corresponding component from model M2.
Function Merge(M1 : Model, M2 : Model)
Define: 〈V1, Ȧ1, Ä1, Ā1〉 ≡M1
Define: 〈V2, Ȧ2, Ä2, Ā2〉 ≡M2
return 〈V1 ∪ V2, Ȧ1 ∪ Ȧ2, Ä1 ∪ Ä2, Ā1 ∪ Ā2〉;1
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Example 2.7. Function MergeM combines the two models from example 2.3 and example
2.5 into a model M = 〈V, Ȧ, Ä, Ā〉 where:
• V = {s, a, b, c, q0, q1}
• Ȧ = {(s, S0), (q0, 1), (q1, 0)}
• Ä = {(s, if s = S0 then S0|S1|S2 elseif s = S1 then S2 else S0),
(q0, q0 ∧ a ∨ q1 ∧ a ∧ b),
(q1, q0 ∨ q1 ∧ b)}
• Ā = {(a, s = S0 ∨ s = S2), (b, s = S2), (c, s = S0 ∨ s = S1)}
2.2.5 Unfolding Models (Unfold)
The goal of function Unfold is to represent the values of the variables of a model M
when it runs for a given number of steps k. The values of the model variables at any
given simulation step i are represented by a fresh set of variables V i. For each step, the
assignments associated with the model variables are replicated and rewritten using the
fresh variables.
Example 2.8. Unfolding the combined model from example 2.7 for one step (k = 1)
produces an output (V,A) where:












(a0, s0 = S0 ∨ s
0 = S2), (b
0, s0 = S2), (c
0, s0 = S0 ∨ s
0 = S1),
(s1, if s0 = S0 then S0|S1|S2 elseif s




0 ∨ q01 ∧ a






(a1, s1 = S0 ∨ s
1 = S2), (b
1, s1 = S2), (c
1, s1 = S0 ∨ s
1 = S1)}
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Function Unfold(M : Model, k : N)
Define: 〈V, Ȧ, Ä, Ā〉 ≡M




foreach (v, e) ∈ Ȧ ∪ Ā do3
Ar := Ar ∪ {(v
0, e[V \V 0])};4
end5
for j := 1 to k do6
Vr := Vr ∪ V
j;7
foreach (v, e) ∈ Ä do8
Ar := Ar ∪ {(v
j, e[V \V j−1])};9
end10
foreach (v, e) ∈ Ā do11
Ar := Ar ∪ {(v





2.2.6 Expanding Invariants (Expand)
Function Expand rewrites an invariant e for the purpose of induction over a given number
of steps k. As in function Unfold , a fresh set of variables is used to represent the values
of the model variables at each step. Using these fresh variables, the function creates an
instance of the invariant for each step and returns the conjunction of all these instances.
Function Expand(V : VSet, e : BExpr, k : N)
Define: V i ≡ {vi | v ∈ V }
er := 1;1
for j := 0 to k do2




Example 2.9. Expanding the invariant from example 2.6 for one step (k = 1) produces a
Boolean expression e where:
e = q00 ∨ (q
0
1 ∧ b




2.2.7 Checking Assignments against Boolean Expressions (Check)
The purpose of function Check is to determine whether a set of assignments A satisfy a
Boolean expression e. The function generates a formula er with an implication where the
antecedent is the conjunction of the assignments in A and the consequent is the Boolean
expression e. Then, the function returns true if and only if the generated formula er is
valid. Notice that function Check can be viewed as a complete decision procedure since
the function terminates (i.e., returns a value of true or false) for all expressions in the
supported grammar.
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Function Check(V : VSet, A : ASet, e : BExpr)
er := 1;1
foreach (v1, e1) ∈ A do2
er := er ∧ (v1 = e1);3
end4
er := er =⇒ e;5
if er = 0 then return false;6
return true;7
2.2.8 K-Step Induction over Models (KInd)
The goal of function KInd is to check whether a model M satisfies an invariant e by in-
duction over k steps. In the base case, the model M is unfolded (from its initial state)
for k − 1 steps and the invariant is expanded for the same number of steps. While in the
inductive case, the model M is unfolded for k steps starting from an arbitrary state (ob-
tained by ignoring the initial-state assignments) while the induction hypothesis is formed
by expanding the invariant for k − 1 steps. The function returns true if and only if the
invariant is satisfied in both the base and inductive cases.
Function KInd(M : Model, e : BExpr, k : N+)
Define: 〈V, Ȧ, Ä, Ā〉 ≡M
/* Base Case */
(Vb, Ab) := Unfold(M,k − 1);1
eb := Expand(V, e, k − 1);2
if Check(Vb, Ab, eb) = false then return false;3
/* Inductive Case */
(Vi, Ai) := Unfold(〈V, {}, Ä, Ā〉, k);4
ei := Expand(V, e, k − 1);5
if Check(Vi, Ai, ei =⇒ e[V \V
k]) = false then return false;6
return true;7
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2.2.9 Verifying Models (Verify)
Function Verify is the core of our SSLTL verification algorithm. The function checks
whether a model M satisfies an SSLTL property p by induction over a given number of
steps k. In addition to M , p, and k, the function takes an input Boolean expression e for
the purpose of strengthening the invariant during induction.
Function Verify starts by translating the property p into an automaton Bp. The au-
tomaton Bp is then compiled into a model Mp and an invariant ep. The generated model
Mp is combined together with the input model M into a new model Ma, which we refer
to as the augmented model. Then, function Verify checks whether the augmented model
Ma satisfies the invariant ep using k-step induction. To keep induction within the reach-
able state space of the augmented model, the invariant ep is strengthened using a Boolean
expression e.
Function Verify returns true if and only if the induction shows that the augmented
model Mp satisfies the strengthened invariant ep ∧ e for the given values of e and k. In
section 2.3, we show the soundness and completeness of this strategy. For the soundness,
we prove that the input model M satisfies the SSLTL property p if Verify returns true for
certain values of e and k. For the completeness, we show that if M satisfies p, there exist
values for e and k that would cause Verify to return true.
Function Verify(M : Model, p : SSLTL, e : BExpr, k : N+)
Define: 〈V, Ȧ, Ä, Ā〉 ≡M




Ma := MergeM (M,Mp);4
r := KInd(Ma, ep ∧ e, k);5
return r;6
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2.3 Soundness and Completeness of SSLTL Verifica-
tion Algorithm
In this section, we prove that the SSLTL verification algorithm in section 2.2 is both sound
and complete. Before presenting the proof, we first define a function, named MergeS , that
combines a state transition system with a Büchi automaton.
Definition 2.11. (STS-BA Product) Function MergeS takes a state transition system
T = 〈AP, S, I, R, L〉 and a Büchi automaton B = 〈2AP
′
, Q, q̇,∆〉 and returns a state
transition system T1 = 〈AP1, S1, I1, R1, L1〉 such that:
• AP1 = AP
• S1 = S × 2
Q
• I1 = {(s, {q̇}) | s ∈ I}
• R1 = {((s, Z), (s
′, Z ′)) | R(s, s′) ∧
Z ′ = {q′ | ∃ q ∈ Z, σ ⊆ L(s). ∆(q, σ, q′)}}
• L1 = λ (s, Z). L(s)
Here is an example to illustrate the purpose of function MergeS :
Example 2.10. Consider the state transition system T from example 2.1 and the Büchi
automatonB from example 2.2 (assuming both q0 and q1 are final states). A state transition
system T1 constructed by combining T and B such that T1 = MergeS (T,B), is shown in
figure 2.3. T1 represents T and B run in parallel and synchronized based on common labels.
The core of our proof is to show that: the problem of proving language containment
between a state transition system T and a Büchi automaton can be transformed into a
problem of verifying an invariant about the states of the product state transition system
T1 = MergeS (T,B). We state this result in theorem 2.1. The theorem also includes the
equivalent problem in the simulation domain for sake of completeness. A detailed proof of












Figure 2.3: An example of an STS-BA product
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Theorem 2.1. Given a state transition system T = 〈AP, S, I, R, L〉 and a finite automaton
B = 〈Σ, Q, q̇,∆〉 where Σ = 2AP
′
for a set of atomic propositions AP ′ where AP ′ ⊆ AP ,
if T1 and T2 are defined such that T1 = MergeS (T,B) and T2 = BAtoSTS (B), then the
following holds:
∀ s. (s, {}) /∈ Reach(T1)
⇐⇒ LangAP
′
(T ) ⊆ Lang(B)
⇐⇒ T1  T2
Theorem 2.1 is used to show that applying our SSLTL verification algorithm (repre-
sented by function Verify) on a model M and an SSLTL property is equivalent to verifying
that M (after being compiled to an STS using function MtoSTS ) satisfies p. We formally
state this result in the following corollary:
Corollary. For any given model M = 〈V, Ȧ, Ä, Ā〉 and SSLTL property p, the following
holds:
(∃ e, k. Verify(M, p, e, k)) ⇐⇒ MtoSTS (M) |= p
The soundness and completeness of our SSLTL verification strategy (function Verify)
are captured in this corollary by the right implication (=⇒) and the left implication (⇐=)
respectively. For the completeness result, we assume that the reachable states of the
augmented model can be described by an expression in the grammar supported by the
(complete) decision procedure represented by function Check .
In reality, even if the reachable states cannot be described by an expression within the
grammar, an over approximation (in the form of an invariant) might be sufficient for the
decision procedure to terminate. In our experience, the fact that reachable states may
not be expressible in the grammar of the decision procedure has no practical impact. The
grammars supported by modern decision procedures (e.g., SMT solvers) are sufficiently
general that we are able to write invariants strong enough to carry out the verification.
To prove the corollary, we start from the left hand side and apply a set of transforma-
tions until reaching the right hand side. The proof, sketched in figure 2.4, boils down to
five main steps:
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∃ e, k. Verify(M, p, e, k)
∃ e, k. KInd(
MergeM (M,BAtoModel(SSLTLtoBA(p))), BAtoInvar(SSLTLtoBA(p)) ∧ e, k
)
∀ s. (s, {}) /∈ Reach(MtoSTS (MergeM (M,BAtoModel(SSLTLtoBA(p)))))
∀ s. (s, {}) /∈ Reach(MergeS (MtoSTS (M), SSLTLtoBA(p)))
Lang(MtoSTS (M)) ⊆ Lang(SSLTLtoBA(p))











Figure 2.4: Proof of sketch of the corollary
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1. Function Verify is rewritten using its definition from subsection 2.2.9.
2. K-Induction on models is expressed as reachability on state transition systems by
substituting λ (s,Q). Q 6= {} for predicate¶ x in the following lemma:
Lemma 2.2. Given a model M and a predicate x, the following equivalence holds:
(∃ e, k. KInd(M,x ∧ e, k)) ⇐⇒ ∀ s1 ∈ Reach(MtoSTS (M)). x(s1)
The proof of lemma 2.2 is done by setting k to one (i.e., 1-step induction) and
choosing e to be the Boolean expression that represents all reachable states of the
STS that corresponds to M (i.e., MtoSTS (M)). As mentioned earlier, we assume
that reachable states can be expressed by an expression in the grammar.
3. The act of merging two models is transformed to an equivalent merge between an
STS and a BA using the following lemma:
Lemma 2.3. The following equivalence holds true for any model M and Büchi au-
tomaton B:
MtoSTS (MergeM (M,BAtoModel(B)))⇐⇒ MergeS (MtoSTS (M), B)
The proof of lemma 2.3 takes the form of a commuting diagram.
4. Theorem 2.1 is used to link reachability to language containment.
5. The relationship between language containment and SSLTL satisfaction is established
through lemma 2.4 which capture the correctness of the Büchi automata construction
algorithm.
Lemma 2.4. Given a state transition system T and an SSLTL property p, T |= p if
and only if Lang(T ) ⊆ Lang(SSLTLtoBA(p)).
¶A predicate is a function which evaluates to either true or false. Hence predicates can be treated as
Boolean expressions. For this reason, we are able to apply the Boolean operator ∧ to x in lemma 2.2
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2.3.1 Proof of Theorem 2.1
The proof of theorem 2.1 is broken down into four goals, one per each implication. Before
stating the goals, we first mention the premises of the proof:
P1. T = 〈AP, S, I, R, L〉 is a state transition system
P2. B = 〈Σ, Q, q̇,∆〉 is an automaton
P3. AP ′ ⊆ AP
P4. Σ = 2AP
′
P5. T1 = MergeS (T,B)
P6. T2 = BAtoSTS (B)
Given the six premises, the goals can be stated as follows:
G1. ∀ s. (s, {}) /∈ Reach(T1) =⇒ Lang
AP ′(T ) ⊆ Lang(B)
G2. ∀ s. (s, {}) /∈ Reach(T1)⇐= Lang
AP ′(T ) ⊆ Lang(B)
G3. ∀ s. (s, {}) /∈ Reach(T1) =⇒ T1  T2
G4. ∀ s. (s, {}) /∈ Reach(T1)⇐= T1  T2
Our general strategy for proving each of these goals is to assume the precedent of the
implication holds, and show that the consequent has to hold as a consequence.
• Proof of goal G1:
Figures 2.5 and 2.6 illustrate the proof of goal G1. We assume that none of the states
(s, {}), for all values of s, can be reached in T1 (step 1), and show that the language
of T has to be a subset of the language of B. To prove such language containment,
we show that for any given word wT in the language of T (step 2), wT has to be in
the language of B as well (step 29).
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Suppose sT is one of the runs of T that generate wT (step 5). A sequence ZT is
defined to keep track of all B-states which are visited if B is to generate wT (step
7). sT and ZT are combined to construct a sequence sT1 (step 8). Then sT1 is shown
to be a run of T1 (step 18). Since states (s, {}) are not reachable in T1, then Z
i
T is
non-empty for each value of i (step 20). That guarantees the existence of a run of B
that generates the word wT (step 28). Hence, wT is in the language of B (step 29).
• Proof of G2:
The proof of goal G2 is presented in figures 2.7 and 2.8. We assume that every word
in the language of T has to be in language of B (step 1) and prove that for any
value of s, none of the states (s, {}) is reachable in T1 (step 27). That is realized by
showing that any state sx that is reachable in T1 (step 2) cannot have the empty set
as its second component (step 26).
Suppose that sx is located on a run of T1 named sT1 (step 5) and a sequence ZT is




By definition of T , the word produced by sT1 (named wk) has to be in the language
of T (step 11) and hence in the language of B as well (step 12).
Let qB be one of the runs of B that generates wT (step 14). By induction, we
show that for any integer i, ZiT has to contain at least the state q
i
B (step 22). That
guarantees that sx cannot have the empty set as its second component (step 26).
• Proof of G3:
Figures 2.9 and 2.10 outline the proof of goal G3. We assume that for all values of s,
none of the states (s, {}) can be reached in T1 (step 1), and show that T2 simulates
T1 (step 37). To prove simulation, we define a binary relation Ĥ such that it contains
every pair ((s, Z), (Z,L(s) ∩ AP ′)) if and only if (s, Z) is among the reachable states
of T1 (step 2) and show that Ĥ is a simulation relation between T1 and T2. In other
words, we show that Ĥ is a binary relation between S1 and S2, and by definition
satisfies the three simulation conditions: initial, invariant, and inductive (step 36).
To show that Ĥ is a binary relation between T1 and T2 states, let ((sT , ZT ), (ZB, σB))
be a pair of arbitrary states that belong to Ĥ (step 3). By definition of Ĥ, (sT , ZT )
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1 ∀ s. (s, {}) /∈ Reach(T1)
2 wT ∈ Lang
AP ′(T )
3 ∀ π ∈ Runs(T1), i ∈ N, s. (s, {}) 6= π
i 1
4 ∃ π ∈ Runs(T ). ∀ i ∈ N. wiT = L(π
i) ∩ AP ′ 2




T ) ∩ AP
′ 4





7 ZT ≡ λ i ∈ N. {q
′ | i = 0 ∧ q′ = q̇









9 s0T1 = (s
0
T , {}) 7, 8
10 s0T1 ∈ I1 6, 9
11 j ∈ N




T ) ∧ s
j+1
T1
= (sj+1T , Z
j+1
T ) 8, 11
13 R(sjT , s
j+1
T ) 4, 9
14 Zj+1T = {q








, sj+1T1 ) 12-15
17 ∀ i ∈ N. R1(s
i
T1
, si+1T1 ) 11, 16
18 sT1 ∈ Runs(T1) 10, 17
19 ∀ i ∈ N, s. (s, {}) 6= siT1 3, 18
20 ∀ i ∈ N. ZiT 6= {} 8, 19
Figure 2.5: Proof of G1
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21 j ∈ N
22 ZjT 6= {} 20, 21
23 ∃ q′ ∈ ZjT . j = 0 ∧ q
′ = q̇








T ∧ j = 0 ∧ q
j
B = q̇
















26 ∃ π. π0 = q̇ ∧ j 6= 0 =⇒ ∆(πj−1, wj−1T , π
j) 23-25
27 ∃ π. π0 = q̇ ∧ ∀ i ∈ N. ∆(πi, wiT , π
i+1) 21, 26
28 ∃ π ∈ Runs(B). ∀ i ∈ N. ∆(πi, wiT , π
i+1) 27
29 wT ∈ Lang(B) 28
Figure 2.6: Proof of G1 (Continued)
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1 ∀ w. w ∈ LangAP
′
(T ) =⇒ w ∈ Lang(B)
2 sx ∈ Reach(T1)
3 ∃ π ∈ Runs(T1), i ∈ N. sx = π
i 2
4 ∃ π. π0 ∈ I1 ∧ ∀ l ∈ N. R1(π
l, πl+1)
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T ) 5, 6
9 sT ∈ Runs(T ) 8
10 wT ≡ λ i ∈ N. L1(s
i
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) ∩ AP ′
11 wT ∈ Lang
AP ′(T ) 9, 10
12 wT ∈ Lang(B) 1, 11
13 ∃ π ∈ Runs(B). ∀ i ∈ N. ∆(πi, wiT , π
i+1) 12
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Figure 2.7: Proof of G2
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21 qj+1B ∈ Z
j+1
T 17-20
22 ∀ i ∈ N. qiB ∈ Z
i
T 16, 17, 21
23 ∀ i ∈ N. ∃ q. q ∈ ZiT 13, 14, 22
24 ∀ i ∈ N. ZiT 6= {} 23
25 ∀ s. sx 6= (s, {}) 5, 7, 24
26 ∀ s. sx 6= (s, {}) 4, 5, 25
27 ∀ s. (s, {}) /∈ Reach(T1) 2, 26
Figure 2.8: Proof of G2 (Continued)
is a state of T1 (step 4). Also, (ZB, σB) has to be a state of T2 (step 12) because ZB
is a subset of Q, σB is a subset of Σ (step 11), and there exists at least one B-state
in ZB that has an outgoing transition whose label is a subset of σB (step 10).
Next, we show that the simulation conditions hold. Suppose that (sT , ZT ) is an
arbitrary state of T1. To prove the initial condition of simulation, we assume that
(sT , ZT ) is one of the initial states of T1 (step 16) and show that (ZT , L(sT ) ∩ AP
′)
is an initial state of T2 (step 21) that simulates (sT , ZT ) by definition of Ĥ (step 18).
The invariant condition follows by showing that for any T2-state sx that simulates
(sT , ZT ) (step 23), the label of sx has to match the label of (sT , ZT ) (step 24).
To prove the inductive condition, let (ZB, σB) be a state of T2 that simulates (sT , ZT ),
and (s′T , Z
′
T ) be a state of T1 that is reachable in one transition from (sT , ZT ) (step 26).
Since (s′T , Z
′




T ) ∩ AP
′)
simulates (s′T , Z
′
T ) (step 29). Based on definition of R2 and Ĥ, it can be shown that
state (Z ′T , L(s
′
T ) ∩ AP
′) has to be reachable in one transition from (ZB, σB) (step
34). The existence of such state (Z ′T , L(s
′
T ) ∩ AP
′) guarantees the satisfaction of the
inductive condition.
• Proof of G4:
The proof of goal G4 can be found in figures 2.11 and 2.12. In the proof, we show
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1 ∀ s. (s, {}) /∈ Reach(T1)
2 Ĥ ≡ {((s, Z), (Z,L(s) ∩ AP ′)) |
(s, Z) ∈ Reach(T1)}
3 Ĥ((sT , ZT ), (ZB, σB))
4 (sT , ZT ) ∈ S1 2,3
5 ZB = ZT 6= {} ∧ σB = L(sT ) ∩ AP
′ 1-3
6 ∃ (s′, Z ′) ∈ S1.
R1((sT , ZT ), (s
′, Z ′))
∧ (s′, Z ′) ∈ Reach(T1) 2
7 (s′T , Z
′





∧ (s′T , Z
′
T ) ∈ Reach(T1) 6
8 Z ′T 6= {} 1, 7
9 ∃ q′ ∈ Z ′T , q ∈ ZT , σ ⊆ L(sT ). ∆(q, σ, q
′) 7, 8
10 ∃ q′ ∈ Q, q ∈ ZB, σ ⊆ σB. ∆(q, σ, q
′) 5, 7, 9
11 ZB ⊆ Q ∧ σB ∈ Σ 4, 5
12 (ZB, σB) ∈ S2 10, 11
13 (sT , ZT ) ∈ S1 ∧ (ZB, σB) ∈ S2 4, 12
14 Ĥ ⊆ S1 × S2 3, 13
15 (sT , ZT ) ∈ S1
16 (sT , ZT ) ∈ I1
17 (sT , ZT ) ∈ Reach(T1) 16
18 Ĥ((sT , ZT ), (ZT , L(sT ) ∩ AP
′)) 2, 17
Figure 2.9: Proof of G3
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19 (ZT , L(sT ) ∩ AP
′) ∈ S2 14, 16, 18
20 ZT = {q̇} 15
21 (ZT , L(sT ) ∩ AP
′) ∈ I2 19, 20
22 (sT , ZT ) ∈ I1 =⇒ ∃ s2 ∈ I2. Ĥ((sT , ZT ), s2) 16, 18, 21
23 Ĥ((sT , ZT ), sx)
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′ = L2(sx) 2, 23
25 ∀ s2. Ĥ((sT , ZT ), s2) =⇒ L1((sT , ZT )) ∩ AP2 = L2(s2) 23, 24
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Figure 2.10: Proof of G3 (Continued)
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that for any value of s, none of the states (s, {}) can be reached in T1 (step 23),
if T2 simulates T1. We realize that by assuming the existence of a binary relation
Ĥ ⊆ S1 × S2 that satisfies the initial, invariant, and inductive simulation conditions
(step 1), and show that an arbitrary reachable T1-state sx (step 2) cannot have the
empty set as its second component (step 22).
Suppose that sx is located on a run of T1 named sT1 (step 5). Define a sequence ZT
and a word wT such that for each i, Z
i
T equals the set of B-states associated with
siT1 (step 6) and w
i
T equals the label of s
i
T1
restricted to the atomic propositions in
AP ′ (step 7). Next, we show by induction that for all integer values of i, every pair
(ZiT , w
i
T ) has to be a state of T2 (step 20) and hence Z
i
T has to be non-empty by
definition of S2 (step 21) which is sufficient to prove that sx does not have the empty
set as its second component (step 22).
To prove the base case of the induction, we use the initial and invariant simulation
conditions (step 1) to show that (Z0T , w
0




12). For the inductive case, we assume that (ZjT , w
j
T ) is a T2-state that simulates
sjT1 where j is an integer (step 13), and use the inductive and invariant simulation
conditions (step 1) to show that (Zj+1T , w
j+1






Our SSLTL verification strategy is meant to be implemented on top of an SMT solver
(such as CVC3 [3] or Z3 [47]) or an invariant checker (such as UCLID [6]). In this case,
function Check can be viewed as a call to the SMT solver or the invariant checker. Also,
the operation of function Unfold can be realized using a symbolic simulator such as the
one built in the UCLID tool.
The invariant e taken as input by function Verify can be determined through an iterative
process. As it is typical for induction, e is initially given a weak value (true for instance)
and gradually strengthened based on information from the counterexamples. The final
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∧ ∀ s2. Ĥ(s1, s2) =⇒ L1(s1) ∩ AP2 = L2(s2)
∧ ∀ s2, s
′
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Figure 2.11: Proof of G4
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Figure 2.12: Proof of G4 (Continued)
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value of e is also dependent on the size of the induction window k. Larger values of k likely
lead to relatively weaker final values for e.
2.5 Summary
SSLTL is the largest fragment of LTL that is safe by syntax. Our approach for verifying
an SSLTL property about a model is to compile the property into an automaton and an
invariant. The automaton is combined together with the model to form the augmented
model. The invariant is checked against the augmented model using k-step induction. The
invariant can be manually strengthened to keep induction within the reachable state space.
Theorem 2.1 shows that our approach is sound and complete. A tool implementing our





This chapter explains our strategy for verifying whether a pipelined microprocessor pre-
serves data and control dependencies among instructions. Section 3.1 provides some back-
ground information about pipelining in microprocessors. It also covers the related research
in the area of formal verification of microprocessors. Section 3.2 presents a simple pipeline
example (called SimPipe) that we use for illustration throughout the chapter. Section 3.3
explains how pipelines are described based on the behavior of their parcels (or instructions).
Most of the concepts presented in section 3.3 are revisited and formalized in section 3.4.
Different aspects of the pipeline-correctness based on the behavior of parcels are ex-
pressed in section 3.5. Section 3.6 introduces the criteria based on which we determine
whether inter-parcel dependencies are correctly handled. In section 3.7, the criteria are
decomposed into smaller properties to reduce verification complexity. The soundness of
the decomposition is shown in section 3.8. The chapter is summarized in section 3.9.
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3.1 Background and Related Work
Subsection 3.1.1 describes pipelining in the context of microprocessors. It explains the
potential conflicts (i.e., hazards) that may arise in a pipelined system, and illustrates some
of the techniques to avoid those conflicts in pipelined microprocessors. Subsection 3.1.2
covers the related research conducted in the area of formal verification of microprocessors.
3.1.1 Pipelining in Microprocessors
Pipelining is an implementation technique used in digital systems (especially microproces-
sors) for enhancing performance [33, 22]. A pipelined system, also referred to as a pipeline,
is analogous to an assembly line: items are processed in an overlapped manner, and they
have to go through many steps each of which contributes something towards the final prod-
uct. The items (to be) processed by a pipeline are referred to as pipeline parcels, or just as
parcels. The steps in a pipeline are called stages. Different pipeline stages process different
parcels in parallel. The state of the pipeline (e.g., parcels progress) is recorded within a
set of storage elements (also known as the physical variables). Among storage elements,
the ones used in passing parcels from one stage to another are widely known as pipeline
registers.
Figure 3.1 shows a simple 5-stage pipeline. The life cycle of a parcel starts at stage S1
and ends at stage S5. During its life cycle, a parcel, described as in-flight, flows through the
pipeline and interacts with (i.e., reads from or writes to) the storage elements. A parcel
proceeds to a stage by moving to the pipeline register at its input, e.g., a parcel proceeds
to S3 by moving to E23. A parcel may skip some stages (e.g., S2) and may repeat others
(e.g., S4).
The major motivation for pipelining is to improve the performance of a system, as
measured by throughput∗, without a significant increase in the system’s area [55]. This
potential improvement in throughput is due to the overlapped processing of parcels as
opposed to the sequential processing of parcels in non-pipelined systems.













Pipeline stage Storage element
E2
E1
Figure 3.1: A 5-stage pipeline
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The performance improvement achieved using a pipelined system over a non-pipelined
one comes at expense of a significant increase in design complexity. Figure 3.1 reflects some
of the structural complexities that may be present in non-linear pipelines. For instance,
some of the stages (e.g., S1) have multiple successors while others (e.g., S4) have multiple
predecessors. This sort of structural complexities must be considered in designing the
pipeline in order to avoid livelock and deadlock.
The structural aspect is just one of the hurdles encountered when designing a pipeline.
Generally, the hurdles every pipeline-designer has to deal with are widely known as pipeline
hazards. Although they are generic to pipelined systems, pipeline hazards are easier ex-
plained in the context of pipelined microprocessors where instructions are treated as parcels.
Conventionally, pipeline hazards are classified into three categories [22, 56]:
1. Structural Hazards : are resource conflicts that may happen when some of the in-flight
instructions try to access shared resources simultaneously. For instance in figure 3.1,
a structural hazard arises from the fact that the two instructions at stages S1 and S2
may try to proceed to stage S3 simultaneously.
2. Control Hazards : are changes in the sequential flow of instructions caused by either
flow-control instructions (e.g., branches and subroutine calls), exceptions, or inter-
rupts. In each of these three cases, the fetching sequence may be disrupted and
some of the in-flight instructions may be discarded. For instance when an instruc-
tion raises an exception, based on the severity of such exception, the processor may
need to cancel some of the in-flight instructions before it resteers the fetch to the
exception handler.
3. Data Hazards : are data dependencies that may exist among the in-flight instructions.
These dependencies impact the order in which instructions are processed by the
pipeline. There are three types of data dependencies:
(a) Read-After-Write (RAW): happens when an instruction (consuming instruc-
tion) depends on the result of an earlier instruction (producing instruction).
For instance in figure 3.2, there is a RAW dependency between instructions p1
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and p2 with respect to register r3. RAW is considered a true dependency because
it reflects the flow of data among instructions.
(b) Write-After-Write (WAW): happens when two instructions write their results
to the same location. This is called output dependency. In figure 3.2, p1 and p3
have an output dependency with respect to r3.
(c) Write-After-Read (WAR): happens when an instruction writes to a location
used as a source operand by an earlier instruction. For instance, figure 3.2
shows a WAR dependency, also known as antidependency, between instructions
p2 and p3 with respect to register r3.
Unlike RAW, neither WAW nor WAR affects the data flow. In fact, both WAW and
WAR dependencies, referred to as name dependencies, can be removed by a technique
that combines renaming with eager forwarding.
p1 : r3 ←− r1 ∗#7
p2 : r2 ←− r3 − r2
p3 : r3 ←− r1 +#3
Figure 3.2: Sequence of instructions
If they are not handled elegantly, pipeline hazards may result in frequent stalls, i.e.,
preventing the next instruction in the instructions stream from being executed during its
designated clock cycle [22], which obviously has a negative impact on the performance.
The risk of performance degradation pushes designers to employ aggressive optimizations
for dealing with pipeline hazards. This is the reason why pipeline hazards are potential
sources of bugs during the design phase. If pipeline hazards are not handled correctly,
they cause so-called pipeline conflicts. Both a pipeline deadlock and a premature read
(i.e., reading a stale value) for a source operand of an in-flight instruction are examples of
pipeline conflicts.
The research outlined in this thesis is closely related to control and data hazards. In
fact, when we refer to instruction (parcel) dependencies, we mean both types of hazards:
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control and data. Structural hazards are rarely referred to in the rest of this thesis since we
deal with term-level models of microarchitectural algorithms that tend to abstract away
low-level details which may cause structural conflicts. Our goal for what remains in this
section is to shed light on some of the microprocessor optimizations dealing with control
and data hazards.
As mentioned before, branches, exceptions, and interrupts are the main causes of control
hazards. For control hazards, we focus only on aspects related to the different variants of
branch instructions. Exceptions are similar to branches in the sense that every instruction
that may raise an exception can be considered a branch. In other words, exceptions can be
modeled by branches. Interrupts are different from exceptions and branches in the sense
that they occur non-deterministically. Hence, they can’t be modeled as branches.
Unlike other instructions, a branch instruction has to be executed before knowing with
certainty the location of the following instruction. There are many schemes for mitigating
the effects of branches:
1. Pipeline stall cycles: once a branch is encountered, the fetch is suspended until the
branch is executed. Obviously, this could lead to a significant loss in performance
gained through pipelining.
2. Branch delay slots: the compiler fills the slots sequentially following to the branch
with some instructions that are independent of the outcome of the branch. This
scheme does not scale well with deeper pipelines where the number of delay slots
gets larger to the extent that they cannot be filled in with useful instructions at
compilation time.
3. Branch prediction: experimental results show that branch instructions exhibit quite
predictable behavior patterns [55]. This scheme makes use of these patterns in iden-
tifying (through prediction) the instruction that follows the branch. Once identified,
that instruction is fetched and executed speculatively. The branch prediction is val-
idated when the branch execution is complete. If a misprediction is detected, the
pipeline has to go through three steps for recovering :
(a) the state of the pipeline at the branch-fetching time is restored.
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(b) the instructions in the the branch shadow are discarded.
(c) the fetch is resteered towards the correct location revealed after branch execu-
tion.
The performance-loss due to misprediction (branch penalty) is a major concern in
this scheme. Frequent mispredictions may have a devastating effect on performance.
Many innovative techniques are employed in order to achieve a high prediction ac-
curacy. The prediction is made for both the branch target and the branch outcome
(e.g., taken or not- taken). Predicting the branch target is typically done through a
lookup in the so-called Branch Target Buffer (BTB), which can be viewed as a cache
for branch targets tagged by branch addresses. Predicting the branch outcome can
be either done statically or dynamically. Predicting the branch outcome as always
not-taken, is an example of the static techniques. Dynamic techniques rely on keeping
the history of branch outcome and using it in making the prediction. In the simplest
case, the history is kept using a two-bit saturation counter and updated based on the
actual branch outcome. More sophisticated techniques, such as two-level adaptive
branch prediction [55], use an additional shift register to adapt to changing dynamic
branching context. With this kind of techniques, the prediction accuracy exceeds
95%.
Several techniques, on both the software and hardware levels, are used for resolving
data hazards. In the software techniques, the compiler is responsible for scheduling in-
structions in a way that preserves data dependencies while providing efficient utilization of
the resources. Such static-scheduling techniques were commonly used in many processors
(e.g., the MIPS family [29]) during the 1980s. The main disadvantage of static scheduling
is that the machine code generated by compilers lacks portability. In fact, a new implemen-
tation of a processor may require a recompilation of the existing programs. This is needed
in order to provide efficient instruction scheduling that makes use of the optimizations
introduced in the new implementation.
A variety of hardware techniques can be used for resolving different types of data haz-
ards. Some of them are described below:
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1. Interlocking : is a safe and simple way for resolving all types of data hazards. Ad-
ditional hardware circuitry detects data dependencies (both true and name depen-
dencies) between instructions. Once a data dependency between two instructions is
detected, pipeline interlocking circuitry stalls the execution of the dependent instruc-
tion until the other instruction has produced its result. Obviously, excessive pipeline
stalling is the main drawback of this technique since it considerably decreases the
pipeline performance.
2. Forwarding : also known as bypassing, is a method for handling RAW data hazards.
Extra hardware, called forwarding logic or bypass path, feeds the result of the producer
instruction back to the front-end of the pipeline (where the source operands are read)
in order to be consumed by the dependent instruction. The forwarding is done as
soon as the producer’s result is output by the execution units. This forwarding
mechanism minimizes the time during which the pipeline stalls the execution of
the consumer instruction. With deeply-pipelined and/or superscalar machines, an
efficient implementation of this mechanism is very expensive, because many bypass
paths and extra multiplexers have to be introduced.
3. Dynamic Scheduling : is an approach by which a hardware circuit, typically referred to
as a scheduler, rearranges instructions at execution time to reduce pipeline stalls while
preserving inter-instruction dependencies. Such out-of-order execution is the main
characteristic distinguishing dynamic scheduling techniques. Dynamic scheduling
simplifies the compiler design and solves the code-portability problem associated with
static scheduling techniques. It also handles many situations where data hazards are
unknown at compile time. Unfortunately, these benefits come at the expense of a
significant increase in hardware complexity.
4. Register Renaming : is a technique for removing name dependencies (WAW and
WAR) between instructions. In this technique, the architectural registers are im-
plemented using a larger number of physical registers. The key idea to eliminate
name dependencies is to avoid using the same physical register as a destination for
more than one of the in-flight instructions. Each new instruction is assigned a unique
physical register (as a destination) and the operands of the following instructions are
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renamed accordingly.
5. Value Prediction: is a speculative technique for exploiting the value locality, i.e., like-
lihood of recurrence of values previously seen by the instructions [39]. The technique
allows instructions to proceed to execution with predicted values for their operands
before the actual values are computed. This aggressive approach has the potential
to push performance beyond the data-flow limit imposed by the true dependencies
among instructions. In concept, value prediction shares some similarities with branch
prediction. For instance, the predicted value has to be validated later on and a re-
covery sequence has to be triggered upon detecting a misprediction. However with
value prediction, a complete value for the source operand(s) (e.g., a 64-bit integer),
as opposed to a one-bit branch outcome, has to be predicted. Therefore, value pre-
dictors (with acceptable accuracies) are much more complicated than history-based
branch predictors. This is a major limitation on the applicability of value prediction.
3.1.2 Formal Verification of Microprocessors
This section discusses related work on formal verification of pipelined microprocessors.
One of the main challenges in verifying pipelined processors is deciding how to relate
the implementation states to the corresponding specification states. In order to justify
the previous statement, let us assume that the specification is a non-pipelined processor
implementing the Instruction Set Architecture (ISA). Assume further that the specification
is able to fetch and completely execute an instruction in a single step. This means that the
states visited by the specification during the execution of a program directly correspond
to the boundaries between program instructions. On the other hand, the implementation
processes multiple instructions in parallel and overlaps each step. Therefore, the states
visited by the implementation when it executes a program are not necessarily in a direct
match with the instruction boundaries. This is the reason why the implementation states
cannot be directly compared to the specification states. Consequently, an abstraction
function is needed to transform the implementation states into states that are comparable
to the corresponding specification states.
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Burch and Dill [8] present an automatic approach for verifying pipelined processors.
The basic idea behind their approach is to push the implementation from its current state
to a flushed state, a state where there are no in-flight instructions; a flushed state can then
be compared to a specification state. For flushing the pipeline, they use an abstraction
function that carries out two operations: stalling the pipeline front-end (i.e., no new in-
structions are allowed to enter the pipeline) and proceeding with normal execution until all
the in-flight instructions complete their execution. Unfortunately, the computational com-
plexity of flushing realistic pipelines, especially for those supporting out-of-order execution,
is unmanageable.
The original flushing approach does not handle any of the liveness aspects of the pipeline
(e.g., freedom of deadlocks). Velev [64] extends the flushing approach to handle liveness
under certain modeling restrictions. The idea is to simulate the pipeline for some fixed num-
ber of steps, n, known to be enough for making a progress (e.g., fetching an instruction).
Knowledge about the implementation of the pipeline is needed in this case to determine n.
Verification scalability can be significantly improved by decomposing the verification
task into smaller subtasks. Hosabettu, Srivas and Gopalakrishnan [25] devise their ab-
straction function as a composition of a set of completion functions, one per each in-flight
instruction. A completion function mimics the desired effect (on observables) of complet-
ing an instruction. The completion functions are called in the order by which instructions
enter the pipeline (i.e., program order). In case of out-of-order execution, program order
is extracted from the reorder buffer [26]. Calling completion functions in program order
has an effect (on observables) that is similar to that of flushing the pipeline. Devising
the abstraction function as a composition of multiple completion functions allows the use
of induction over pipeline stages in comparing implementation states against specification
states.
In both flushing and completion functions techniques, correctness requires comparing
implementation states (after abstraction) to specification states each time the implemen-
tation takes a step; this type of correctness is called single-step correctness. On the other
hand, multi-step correctness requires comparing implementation states against specifica-
tion states at certain points during the implementation run. For instance, Sawada and
Hunt [53] carry out the comparison whenever the implementation visits a state that hap-
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pens to be a flushed state; in this case an abstraction function is not needed. Aagaard,
Day and Luo [2] prove that multi-step correctness is equivalent to single-step correctness
under certain conditions.
Manolois [41] expresses the correctness of pipelined microprocessors in terms of a
Well-founded Equivalence Bisimulation (WEB). Verification is done by proving a WEB-
refinement theorem that guarantees that the pipeline has exactly the same infinite execu-
tions as the specification (ISA), up to stuttering. The theorem specifies the liveness of the
pipeline in terms of a function (called rank function) that maps the pipeline states to some
ordered values which can be used to measure progress (e.g., the number of steps needed to
be taken in order to fetch a new instruction). The WEB-refinement theorem is extended
to support a hierarchical form of compositional reasoning [42].
In another decomposition style, McMillan [44] uses knowledge about the pipeline behav-
ior to manually derive a set of model checking obligations. These obligations are localized
with respect to the logical sections of the pipeline. The verification relies on SMV support
for compositional model checking.
Aagaard [1] introduces a correctness statement (PipeOk) for pipelined circuits based
upon conventional pipeline hazards. The main idea behind this technique is that a pipelined
implementation is correct if it correctly handles its structural, control and data hazards.
Aagaard proves that PipeOk guarantees single-step correctness. PipeOk is expressed as
a set of correctness obligations associated with different types of pipeline hazards. Based
on PipeOk, Shehata and Aagaard [54] present a generic strategy for verifying register
renaming techniques. They introduce a set of predicates to characterize register renaming
schemes and provide a set of model-checking obligations that are sufficient to guarantee
the data-hazard obligations in PipeOk.
The conventional approach to the formal verification of a microprocessor is to construct
a single, monolithic, correctness criterion. The verification relies on lemmas and invariants
that are defined on a case-by-case basis for each pipeline. The conventional approach looks
at a state of the pipeline, which is problematic because the large number of in-flight parcels
causes capacity problems in verification.
Our work provides a general definition of correctness and a general verification strat-
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egy that decomposes the top-level correctness statement into simpler obligations about
data/control dependencies between parcels on individual variables. Our approach saves
the effort and potential mistakes of creating custom definitions of correctness and verifica-
tion strategies for each pipeline.
3.2 Pipeline Example: SimPipe
To illustrate the concepts introduced in this chapter, we use the three-stage pipeline
SimPipe shown in figure 3.3. The purpose of SimPipe is to add up the initial contents of
an unbounded memory array M . The ultimate goal is to store, in each location Mj , the
summation of the initial contents of the preceding locations added to its initial value, i.e.,
∑j
k=0 Ṁk where Ṁk is the initial value of location Mk.
SimPipe adds up the the memory contents incrementally. It uses a counter C to keep
track of the next memory location to be processed. Suppose C holds a value of j at a
given state. The first stage (S1) increments the counter C and reads the value of location
Mj+1. Next, stage S1 passes the new value of C (i.e., j+1) along with the value read from
location Mj+1 to the following stage S2 through registers C12 and D12 respectively. Stage
S1 also resets the (bubble-flag) register B12 to indicate that the contents of registers C12
and D12 are valid.
During the second stage (S2), the value stored in register D12 (i.e., the value of Mj+1) is
added to the contents of register D23. By doing so, register D23 would carry the summation
of memory locations M0 through Mj+1. Also during this stage, the values of B12 and C12
are copied to registers B23 and C23 respectively.
In the last stage (S3), the content of D23 is written to the memory location whose
address is the value of C23. In other words, the summation of locations from M0 to Mj+1
gets stored to location Mj+1. This write operation takes place if and only if the value of
B23 is false, i.e., the values carried by C23 and D23 are valid.
In order for SimPipe to work correctly, three initial conditions need to be satisfied.
































Figure 3.3: SimPipe pipeline
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to the content of location M0. Third, registers B12 and B23 shall store a value of true.
There are no restrictions on the initial contents of registers C12 and C23.
The functionality of SimPipe is best described by the non-pipelined system shown in
figure 3.4. This system can be used as a reference model, i.e., the specification machine
against which SimPipe is compared. In the rest of this chapter, we refer to the pipelined
and non-pipelined versions of SimPipe shown in figures 3.3 and 3.4 as the implementation





















Figure 3.4: Non-pipelined specification of SimPipe
The specification of SimPipe achieves the same functionality of stages S1, S2, and
S3 combined together in a single step. At any given state, assuming register C holds a
value of j, the system reads the values of locations Mj and Mj+1, adds these two values
together, and writes the result back to location Mj+1. One major difference here is that
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the specification obtains the value of the summation
∑j
k=0 Ṁk directly from location Mj
unlike the case of the implementation where the summation value is read from register D23.
This is why a memory component that has two read ports is used in the specification.
3.3 Parcel-Centric View of Pipelines
The conventional analogy between a pipeline and an assembly line is made clear in subsec-
tion 3.1.1. In both systems, items (or parcels) in process go through a sequence of steps
(or stages) each of which makes a contribution towards the final product (or result). More
clearly in the case of a pipeline, the final result depends on the way the parcel interacts
with both the state of the pipeline and the other parcels.
In this section, we focus on explaining the key concepts used in modeling both parcel-
state and parcel-parcel (i.e., inter-parcel) interactions. These concepts are the basic build-
ing blocks of the correctness criteria presented in the rest of the thesis. Most of the topics
discussed in this section are formalized later in section 3.4.
We start by describing the different phases in the lifetime of a parcel. At any state,
a parcel can be in one of the following four phases: top, in-flight, retired, and discarded.
Before it enters the pipeline, a parcel is considered to be in the top phase. Once a parcel
is fetched, its phase changes to become in-flight. The phase stays in-flight until processing
the parcel is either completed or abandoned. At this point, the parcel exits the pipeline,
and as a consequence, its phase changes to either retired or discarded respectively.
Example 3.1. Suppose that a parcel in the SimPipe implementation, the pipeline shown
in figure 3.3, is identified by the natural number held by register C at the time when the
parcel starts to be processed. Suppose further that C holds a value of p at the current
state. This means that parcel p has just become in-flight. Parcels p − 1 and p − 2 are
also in-flight if p − 1 and p − 2 are valid identifiers (i.e., natural numbers). These two
identifiers are valid if and only if B12 and B23 store false values, respectively. All parcels
with identifiers greater than p have not entered the pipeline yet. Therefore, these parcels
are in the top phase. On the other hand, all the parcels identified with natural numbers
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less than p − 2 are no longer in-flight. Hence, these parcels are in the retired phase since
no parcels are discarded in SimPipe.
The state of any pipeline is stored in elements called the physical variables. The physical
variables should be distinguished from those variables that are mentioned in the specifi-
cations of the pipeline (e.g., Instruction Set Architecture). We refer to the latter as the
architectural variables. The architectural variables are not actual storage elements in the
pipeline and hence they are not part of the pipeline state. The state of the pipeline is
exclusively held by the physical variables since they are the actual storage elements of the
pipeline.
The state of the pipeline is interpreted using an address map that relates the physical
variables to the architectural variables. At any given state, each physical variable is mapped
to at most one architectural variable, and for each architectural variable there exists at
least one physical variable that is mapped to that architectural variable.
The mapping relationship between a physical variable and an architectural variable
can be either static or dynamic. For instance, an architectural register can be represented
in the processor implementation by two physical variables: an entry in the (physical)
register file and a bypass register. In the first case, the register-file entry is dedicated to
the architectural register and hence the mapping is static. In the second case, the bypass
register may, over time, carry values that belong to multiple architectural registers and
hence the mapping in this case is dynamic.
Example 3.2. The physical variables of the SimPipe implementation are C, B12, C12, D12,
B23, C23, D23, andMj for all j ∈ N. Based on the specification of SimPipe, the architectural
variables are C and Mj for all j ∈ N. The physical variable C is statically mapped to the
corresponding architectural variable C. On the other hand, D23 gets dynamically mapped
over time to different locations in the architectural memory. The location represented by
D23 at a given state depends on the contents of registers B23 and C23. If the value of B23 is
false (i.e., not a bubble), then D23 is mapped to the location whose address is held by C23,
because this is where the value in D23 will be stored. Otherwise, D23 does not carry valid
data, and consequently, it does not represent any locations in the architectural memory.
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The specifications of the pipeline determine which architectural variables a parcel should
read from and/or write to. We refer to the architectural variables that need to be read
by a parcel (according to the specifications) as the sources of the parcel. Similarly, the
architectural variables to which a parcel should write (according to the specifications) are
the destinations of the parcel.
Parcels interact with the state of the pipeline during the in-flight phase by reading
from and/or writing to the physical variables that are mapped to their sources and/or
destinations respectively. This parcel-state interaction may be speculative. A parcel may
write a speculative value to a physical variable v1 that is mapped to one of its destinations
va. If the parcel detects that the written value is incorrect, the parcel signals mispredict
and takes steps towards recovery. To recover from a misprediction, the parcel can either
make a corrective write or go to the discard phase. The corrective write can be made to
any physical variable v2, which may or may not be v1, as long as it is mapped to va. The
variable v1 becomes not mapped to va until its contents are corrected.
A parcel can also make an arbitrary number of speculative reads from physical variables
that are mapped to its sources. Similar to the write case, a parcel can read any of its sources
multiple times using different physical variables that are mapped to that source. The last
read by a parcel from any physical variable that is mapped to a source va is called the final
read from va. All but the final reads are considered speculative and therefore do not affect
the final results of the parcel.
The definition of the dual concept (final writes) is slightly different. A final write made
by a parcel to a destination va is the latest write of a new value to any physical variable
that is mapped to va. The major difference here is that the final write may take place
before the last write. In other words, after a parcel makes its final write to a detention va,
the parcel can copy that value to other physical variables that are mapped to va. Allowing
this behavior is important for modeling forwarding techniques in microprocessors. Similar
to the case of the reads, all but the final writes are considered speculative and hence should
not have any impact on the final “architectural” state of the pipeline†. The architectural
state of a pipeline is captured by the subset of physical variables that are mapped to
†Final state here means any state that can be reached from the current state by flushing the pipeline.
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architectural variables.
Both control and data flow among parcels in a pipeline have to be consistent with the
way parcels are ordered. In the context of microprocessors, this order takes the form of a
program that specifies both control and data dependencies among instructions (or parcels).
Inter-parcel dependencies manifest themselves in the way parcels read from and write to
the physical variables.
Two situations need to be addressed in order to handle inter-parcel dependencies cor-
rectly. The first situation is when a parcel p2 has a source va that is a destination of an
older parcel p1 (i.e., p1 comes in order before p2), and va is not a destination of any parcel
that comes in between p1 and p2. In this case, we refer to p1 and p2 as the producer and
the consumer respectively, and we briefly describe this situation by saying that there is a
direct dependency from p1 to p2.
The second situation is about a consumer that has no producer. This happens when a
parcel p has a source va that is not the destination of any older parcel. We describe this
situation by saying there is no dependency from any parcel to p. In section 3.6, we present
two minimally-restrictive rules to guarantee that inter-parcel dependencies are preserved
in both the direct-dependency and no-dependency situations.
3.4 Parcel-Based Instrumentation of Pipelines
Specifying criteria to judge the correctness of the implementation is a key step in formal
verification. In the case where the focus is on verifying whether a pipeline preserves de-
pendencies between parcels, devising these criteria requires a mechanism for identifying
parcels and marking certain events that take place during their lifetime. In this section,
we show how a pipeline can be systematically instrumented to track individual parcels and
monitor their interaction with each other as well as with the pipeline state variables (i.e.,
physical variables). We use this instrumentation technique in section 3.6 to specify prop-
erties to guarantee that parcel-to-parcel communication is done properly. Other aspects of
pipeline-correctness can be expressed using this instrumentation technique as explained in
section 3.5.
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We start by presenting a mathematical model for pipelines. A pipeline X is defined as
a six-tuple 〈V, Va, Q, Q̇, T,AM〉 where:
• V is the set of physical variables.
• Va is the set of architectural variables.
• Q is the set of states. Each state is an environment (over V ) that maps each variable
in V to a value. The value of a variable v ∈ V at a state q ∈ Q is denoted by q.v.
• Q̇ ⊆ Q is the set of initial states.
• T ⊆ Q × Q is the transition relation.
• AM ⊆ V × Va × Q is the address map predicate. Notationally, AM
va
v q means that a
physical variable v is mapped to an architectural variable va at a state q. It is possible




all v′a ∈ Va.
Example 3.3. The address map predicate AM for the SimPipe implementation can be
formally defined by pattern-matching one of the following cases:
AMCC q ≡ True
AMMkMj q ≡ (j = k)
AMMkD23 q ≡ ¬q.B23 ∧ (k = q.C23)
AM q ≡ False
where the last case matches all the patterns that are not matched by the first three cases.
Since D12, C12, and C23 are not used in exchanging either data or control information
among parcels, none of these physical variables is mapped to an architectural variable.
A run of the pipeline X is an infinite sequence of states σ =≪ σ0σ1σ2 . . .≫ where
σ0 ∈ Q̇ and T (σi, σi+1) for all i ∈ N. The set of runs of X is denoted as Runs(X ).
To be able to track parcels, we augment the pipeline with a mechanism for identifying
parcels and a set of predicates that captures relevant events in the lifetime of those parcels.
More specifically, the pipeline X is augmented by adding the following three components:
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1. Parcel identifiers : an ordered set 〈P,≺〉 where P is an infinite set of parcel identifiers
and ≺ ⊆ P × P is a total order over these identifiers.
Example 3.4. The ordered set 〈P,≺〉 used to identify parcels in SimPipe can be
defined to be 〈N, <〉
2. Phase predicates : used to probe the phase of a parcel at any given state. Four
predicates are used for that purpose:
(a) Top predicate (Top ⊆ P × Q): holds for parcels that have not entered the
pipeline yet.
(b) In-flight predicate (Infl ⊆ P × Q): holds for parcels that are being processed
by the pipeline.
(c) Discarded predicate (Dis ⊆ P × Q): holds for parcels that have been discarded
and no longer processed by the pipeline.
(d) Retired predicate (Ret ⊆ P × Q): holds for parcels that have been completely
processed and exited the pipeline.
Example 3.5. The phase predicates in the SimPipe implementation can be defined
as follows:
Top p q ≡ p > q.C
Infl p q ≡ p ≤ q.C ∧ p ≥ q.C − 2
Ret p q ≡ p < q.C − 2
Dis p q ≡ False
3. Interaction predicates : used to capture events in which parcels interact with the state
of the pipeline. Two predicates are used for that purpose (supposing D is the set of
values that can be held by variables in V ):
(a) Read predicate (Rd ⊆ V × Va × D × P × Q): holds when a parcel reads from
a variable. Notationally, Rdvav d p q means that a parcel p reads a data value d
from a physical variable v that is mapped to an architectural variable va. Notice
that the mapping relationship between v and va should hold at the time when
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the read takes place, which can be formally captured as follows:
∀ σ, v, va, p, d, j. σ ∈ Runs(X ).
Rdvav d p σ
j =⇒ AMvav σ
j
Example 3.6. The read predicates in the SimPipe implementation can be de-
fined as follows:
RdCC d p q ≡ p = q.C ∧ d = q.C ∧ AM
C
C q








Rd d p q ≡ False
(b) Write predicate (Wr ⊆ V × Va × D × P × Q): holds when a parcel writes to a
variable. The write predicate (Wr) is notationally similar to the read predicate
(Rd). However, when the write takes place at a state q, the mapping relationship
holds in the following state q′. Also, the written value becomes available at q′.
These two characteristics are described by the following formula:
∀ σ, v, va, p, d, j. σ ∈ Runs(X ).
Wrvav d p σ
j =⇒ AMvav σ
j+1 ∧ σj+1.v = d
Example 3.7. The write predicates in the SimPipe implementation can be
defined as follows:
WrCC d p q ≡ p = q.C ∧ d = q.C + 1
WrMkMj d p q ≡ ¬q.B23 ∧ p = q.C23 ∧ d = q.D23 ∧ j = k
WrMkD23 d p q ≡ ¬q.B12 ∧ p = q.C12 ∧ d = q.D12 + q.D23 ∧ k = q.C12
Wr d p q ≡ False
In addition to the parcel predicates used for augmenting the pipeline X , we introduce
four shortcut predicates:
1. Fetch predicate (Fetch ⊆ P × Q): holds when a parcel (among those in the top
phase) is about to enter the pipeline. This happens right before a parcel becomes
in-flight. The following formula captures the semantics of the fetch predicate:
∀ σ, p, j. σ ∈ Runs(X ).
Fetch p σj ⇐⇒ Top p σj ∧ Infl p σj+1
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2. Retire predicate (Retire ⊆ P × Q): holds when an in-flight parcel is about to exit the
pipeline after completion. This is immediately before that parcel becomes retired.
The semantics of the retire predicate are formalized as follows:
∀ σ, p, j. σ ∈ Runs(X ).
Retire p σj ⇐⇒ Infl p σj ∧ Ret p σj+1
3. Final-read predicate (FRd ⊆ V × Va × D × P × (N → Q) × N): holds when
a parcel reads a value associated with an architectural variable and afterwords the
parcel makes no other reads from any physical variables mapped to that architectural
variable. The final-read predicate is formalized as:
∀ σ, v, va, p, d, j. σ ∈ Runs(X ).
FRdvav d p σ j
⇐⇒
Rdvav d p σ
j
∧ ∀ v′, d′, k. k > j. ¬(Rdvav′ d
′ p σk)
4. Final-write predicate (FWr ⊆ V × Va × D × P × (N → Q) × N): holds in a
state at which a parcel writes the final value of an architectural variable. Unlike the
definition of the final read, following writes may happen as long as the value being
written is always the same. The final-write predicate is formalized as:
∀ σ, v, va, p, d, j. σ ∈ Runs(X ).
FWrvav d p σ j
⇐⇒
Wrvav d p σ
j
∧ ∀ v′, d′, k. d′ 6= d, k > j. ¬(Wrvav′ d
′ p σk)
Other variations of the predicates presented in this section are needed to express dif-
ferent aspects of correctness concisely. Instead of introducing new predicates, we overload
the predicates presented above in three different ways:
1. We use a run instead of a state to mean that at least one of the states within that
run satisfies the predicate. For instance, Retire p σ where σ ∈ Runs(X ) is equivalent
to ∃ i. Retire p σi.
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2. We remove the state argument when the predicates are used in a context in which
states are implicit. For example, in the context of linear temporal logic, we write
G ¬Wrvav p to mean that Wr
va
v p q never holds in any future state q.
3. We remove arguments other than the state as a means of existential quantification.
For instance, Wrva p q is equivalent to ∃ v′, d′. Wrvav′ d
′ p q. Using this notation, we
can briefly express an anonymous write to a physical variable v at a state q as: Wrv q.
3.5 Parcel-Based Correctness of Pipelines
This section describes ongoing work in collaboration with Aagaard. Our individual work
resumes in section 3.6. The collaborative work is aimed at a general, high-level, and
complete definition of correctness independent of any particular verification technique.
Inter-parcel correctness is a key aspect of overall correctness. As defined later in this
section, inter-parcel correctness refers to the behavior of data values across potentially
distant points in time in an infinite stream of computation. In section 3.6, we take the
stream- and data-based definition of inter-parcel correctness and translate it into a form
that is more amenable to automated verification.
The focus in this section is to express the correctness of a pipeline in terms of the
behavior of its parcels. The main idea is to compare the writes made by the parcels in a
pipeline (i.e., implementation) against those made by the corresponding parcels in a non-
pipelined reference model (i.e., specification). The pipeline is said to be correct if those
two sets of writes are equivalent.
Suppose that the implementation is a pipeline I = 〈Vi, Va, Qi, Q̇i, Ti,AM〉 that is aug-
mented with the four components:
1. an ordered set of parcel identifiers: 〈Pi,≺〉.
2. a set of phase predicates: {Top, Infl,Ret,Dis}.
3. a set of interaction predicates: {Rd,Wr}.
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4. a set of shortcut predicates: {Fetch,Retire,FRd,FWr}.
By definition, the architectural variables in the implementation are those variables
referenced by the specification. On that basis, we model the specification as a pipeline
whose physical variables match those in Va. In other words, let the specification be a
pipeline S = 〈Va, Va, Qs, Q̇s, Ts, {(va, va, qs) | va ∈ Va ∧ qs ∈ Qs}〉. Notice that the address
map predicate is defined such that each variable is mapped to itself.
In order to track the writes of parcels in the specification, S is augmented with two
components:
1. an ordered set of parcel identifiers. To simplify the presentation, we assume without
loss of generality that parcels in the specification are identified by natural numbers,
i.e., the ordered set of identifiers is 〈N, <〉.
2. a write predicate SWr.
In the specification, parcels are neither overlapped nor speculatively processed. In each
step the specification fetches a new parcel and processes it until completion. Therefore,
parcels processed in a given run of the specification can be simply identified by state indices
with that run. On the contrary, parcels in the implementation may be overlapped and/or
discarded while being processed. Only those parcels that retire in the implementation
match parcels in the specification.
Whether a parcel pi in an implementation run σi matches a parcel ps in a specification
run σs, denoted pi
σiσs===
PCL
ps, is defined by induction over ps. In the base case, where ps = 0,
pi matches ps if and only if pi is the first parcel to retire. In the inductive case, where
ps > 0, assuming parcels in the implementation retire in order, pi matches ps if and only
if pi is the first parcel to retire after the parcel that matches ps − 1. The parcels-matching
relation ===
PCL






BASE (ps = 0) :
Retire pi σi
∧ ∀ p′i ≺ pi. ¬(Retire p
′
i σi)
INDUCTIVE (ps > 0) :
Retire pi σi









i ≺ pi. ¬(Retire p
′′
i σi)
The equivalence between the final writes made by pi during σi and those made by ps
during σs is denoted as pi
σiσs===
FWr
ps. Such an equivalence means that both pi and ps write to
the same set of architectural variables. It also means that the values produced during the
final writes of pi are the same as those written by ps. The relation ===
FWr
, which is called






Wrva pi σi ⇐⇒ SWr
va ps σs
∧ ∀ vi, j, k.
FWrvavi pi σi j




σj+1i .vi = σ
k+1
s .va
Given the parcels equality and the final-writes equality defined above, the correctness
is stated by saying that: the final writes of each parcel that retires in the implementation
I shall be equivalent to the writes of the matching parcel in the specification S. We refer to
this correctness statement as the final-writes containment. The final-writes containment is
formally expressed as follows:








The final-writes containment can be decomposed into two criteria. The first of which
guarantees that a parcel in the implementation would behave correctly in isolation from
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other parcels. We refer to this aspect as the intra-parcel correctness. The main purpose
of the intra-parcel correctness is to make sure that the datapath of the implementation
meets the specification. The intra-parcel correctness also covers some aspects related to
parcels flow. For instance, it ensures that a parcel is not lost, duplicated, or created, and
guarantees that a parcel is steered to the right stage. The second criterion addresses the
interaction between parcels and guarantees that inter-parcel dependencies are preserved.
We refer to this aspect as the inter-parcel (dependency) correctness. The goal of the inter-
parcel correctness is to ensure that both control and data flow in the implementation are
consistent with the specification.
The intra-parcel correctness states that: if the final values read by an implementation
parcel pi are the same as those read by the corresponding specification parcel ps, then
the final values written by pi shall be identical to those written by ps. The intra-parcel
correctness is formally expressed as follows:





∧ (∀ va, d. FRd
va d pi σi ⇐⇒ σ
ps
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The inter-parcel correctness can be viewed as a protocol for parcel communications
which guarantees that parcel dependencies are correctly handled by the implementation.
This protocol takes the form of two rules that address the direct-dependency and the no-
dependency situations explained in section 3.3. Both rules rely on the way parcels are
ordered in the implementation and make no reference to the specification. Consequently,
no reference model is needed for verifying these two rules.
We refer to the first rule as the producer-consumer rule. This rule addresses the case
when there is a direct dependency from a parcel p1 to a parcel p2 with respect to an
architectural variable va. The rule ensures that there is a physical variable vi through
which the data is passed from p1 to p2 properly. In other words, p1 writes the final value of
va to vi, p2 makes its final read of va from vi, and no other parcel writes to vi in between.
The direct-dependency rule is formally stated as follows:
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∀ σi, va, p1, p2. σi ∈ Runs(I).
Retire p1 σi ∧ Retire p2 σi ∧ p1 ≺ p2
∧Wrva p1 σi ∧ Rd
va p2 σi ∧ ∀ p. p1 ≺ p ≺ p2. ¬(Wr
va p σi)
=⇒
∃ vi, x, y.
FWrvavi p1 σi x ∧ FRd
va
vi
p2 σi y ∧ ∀ z. x < z < y. ¬(Wrvi σ
z
i )
The second rule is called the no-producer rule. This rule considers the case in which
a parcel p does not depend on any older parcel with respect to an architectural variable
va. The rule guarantees that p shall make its final read of va from a physical variable vi to
which no parcels make any writes. The no-dependency rule is expressed as follows:
∀ σi, va, p. σi ∈ Runs(I).
Retire p σi
∧ Rdva p σi ∧ ∀ p
′ ≺ p. ¬(Wrva p′ σi)
=⇒
∃ vi, x.
FRdvavi p σi x ∧ ∀ y < x. ¬(Wrvi σ
y
i )
Specifying and verifying the inter-parcel correctness is one of the main contributions of
this thesis. In section 3.6, we provide another version of the inter-parcel correctness that
can be used in verifying implementations with abstract datapaths. Through the case study
in chapter 4, we illustrate how the inter-parcel correctness can be verified in the context
of microprocessors.
3.6 Specifying Inter-Parcel Correctness
This section introduces the criteria we use in determining whether a pipelined implemen-
tation preserves the dependencies between parcels. The criteria are formulated as two
properties that correspond to the two inter-parcel rules presented in section 3.5. The first
property describes the interaction between any two parcels where the leading parcel pro-
duces data to be consumed by the trailing parcel. In the second property, we address the
case in which a parcel consumes data that is not produced by any leading parcel. The first
is called producer-consumer property while the second is called the no-producer property.
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The purpose of the inter-parcel rules is to define correctness from a mathematical per-
spective. The rules emphasize clarity and generality, and make use of infinite streams,
comparison of data values across distant points in time and other features that are difficult
to verify automatically. To simplify verification, we introduce additional instrumentation
that allows us to translate these rules about infinite streams into properties about individ-
ual states that do not refer to data values.
We introduce instrumentation predicates to represent complex expressions in rules. The
first category of complex expressions makes reference to data values. By replacing refer-
ences to data values with instrumentation predicates, we reduce verification complexity by
enabling the datapath to be abstracted away. The second category of complex expressions
describe complicated sequences of events. Using an instrumentation predicate, verifying a
rule is decomposed into two simpler tasks: (1) verifying the rule with the predicate in place
of the complex expression and (2) verifying that the behavior of the predicate is consistent
with the expression that it replaces.
We introduce three instrumentation predicates. The definitions of these predicates will
vary from pipeline to pipeline. With each predicate, we give a criterion that the predicate
must satisfy to ensure that the definition of the predicate is consistent with the intention.
For an instrumented pipeline I as described in section 3.5, the predicates are:
1. Direct-dependency predicate (DDep ⊆ Va × P × P × Q): marks a direct-dependency
between two parcels with respect to an architectural variable. For instance, DDepva p1 p2 q
means that, at a state q, there is a direct-dependency from a parcel p1 to a parcel p2
with respect to an architectural variable va. In other words, va is both a destination
of p1 and a source of p2, and va is not a destination of any parcel that comes in
between p1 and p2, and eventually retires. The direct-dependency predicate should
be defined such that:








Retire p1 σi ∧ Retire p2 σi ∧ p1 ≺ p2
∧Wrva p1 σi ∧ Rd
va p2 σi
∧ ∀ p. p1 ≺ p ≺ p2. Retire p σi =⇒ ¬(Wr
va p σi)
70
2. No-dependency predicate (NoDep ⊆ Va × P × Q): holds when a parcel does not
depend on any leading parcels with respect to an architectural variable. For instance,
NoDepva p q means that, at a state q, there is no dependency from any older parcel
to a parcel p with respect to an architectural variable va. Meaning that va is a source
of p2 and not a destination of any parcel that comes before p1, and eventually retires.
The no-dependency predicate should be defined such that:
∀ σi, va, p, x. σi ∈ Runs(I).




∧ Rdva p σi
∧ ∀ p′ ≺ p. Retire p σi =⇒ ¬(Wr
va p′ σi)
3. Mispredict predicate (Mp ⊆ Va × P × Q): holds when a parcel signals mispredict
on the value of an architectural variable. The mispredict predicate should be defined
such that:
∀ σi, va, d, d
′, x, x′. σi ∈ Runs(I).
Wrva d p σxi ∧Wr
va d′ p σx
′
i ∧ d 6= d
′ ∧ x < x′
=⇒
∃ y. x < y ≤ x′. Mpva p σyi
Figures 3.5 and 3.6 use two timing diagrams to describe the scenarios specified in the
producer-consumer and no-producer properties respectively. The x-axis represents the
states. The y-axis represents the predicates. The predicates are grouped based on the
parcels and/or the variables that they share. The values of the predicates are denoted by
circles. A solid circle denotes a value of true while a hollow circle denotes a value of false.
For the phase predicates, we use the first letter to imply a true value, i.e., a circle with
the letter “I” implies that the predicate “Infl” is true, etc. At any given state, the value of
a predicate can be either a precondition or a postcondition in the specified scenario. The
value is a postcondition by default. All preconditions are marked.
In figure 3.5, we sketch the scenario specified in the producer-consumer property. The
scenario marks some events of interest taking place during the lifetime of two arbitrary
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parcels p1 and p2 representing the producer and the consumer respectively. The scenario
highlights four preconditions that need to be satisfied in order to enforce the producer-
consumer relationship between p1 and p2.
The scenario begins at some state qF1 where p1 enters the pipeline (first precondition)
and shows that p1 eventually becomes retired (second precondition). The scenario ends
when the consumer parcel p2 exits the pipeline at some state qR2 (third precondition) where



























Figure 3.5: Producer-consumer property
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As shown in figure 3.5, the key to satisfying the producer-consumer property is the
existence of some physical variable vi (mapped to va) through which the data is passed
from the producer p1 to the consumer p2. The way the producer-consumer relationship is
enforced in the property is threefold. First, the producer p1 makes a final write to vi at
some state qw. Second, the consumer p2 makes a final read from vi at some state qr. Third,
to insure the data is passed correctly from the producer to the consumer, no other parcel
is allowed to write to vi in between states qw and qr.
The producer-consumer property makes no restrictions on the way the producing and
consuming parcels interact with the pipeline state prior to making their final write and read
respectively. In other words, the producer p1 may make an arbitrary number of speculative
writes to those physical variables that are mapped to va before reaching qw. Similarly, the
consumer p2 may speculatively read from the physical variables that are mapped to va for
an arbitrary number of times before its final read at state qr.
The producer-consumer property, sketched in figure 3.5, can be formally expressed in
the linear temporal logic as follows:
PropProdCons ≡















































































































































































The no-producer property is pictorially represented in figure 3.6. The scenario sketched
in the figure begins from the initial state q0 and involves some events related to an arbitrary
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consuming parcel p. The scenario has three preconditions. First, parcel p enters the pipeline
at some state qF . Second, p exits at some following state qR. Third, at state qR, p does



















Figure 3.6: No-producer property
If the three preconditions are satisfied, the no-producer property guarantees the exis-
tence of some physical variable vi from which p makes its final read for the value of va at
some state qr. It also guarantees that no parcels have written to vi at any state before qr.
Hence, the initial value of vi is kept unchanged until it gets consumed by p.
Similar to the producer-consumer property, the no-producer property allows the con-
sumer p to freely interact with pipeline state before making its final read at qr. The
no-producer property is formally specified in the linear temporal logic as follows:
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PropNoProd ≡












































































3.7 Decomposing Inter-Parcel Correctness
In section 3.6, the inter-parcel dependency correctness is presented in the form of two prop-
erties: PropProdCons and PropNoProd. Both of these properties address some key
events in the lifetime of any parcel and describe the interaction between parcels that may
or may not overlap in time. Due to the temporal complexity of properties PropProdCons
and PropNoProd, we break them down into a set of smaller properties that are more
suitable for model checking. In breaking down PropProdCons and PropNoProd, we
introduce an extra predicate:
Source predicate (Src ⊆ Va × P × Q): shows whether an architectural variable is the
source of a parcel.
In this section, we focus on explaining the properties resulting from the decomposition.
The soundness of the decomposition is proven in section 3.8. We classify the properties pre-
sented here into two categories: obligations (subsection 3.7.1) and consistency conditions
(subsection 3.7.2). The purpose of the obligations is to uncover bugs in the implementa-
tion. The consistency conditions on the other hand capture inconsistencies in predicates
definitions and prevent vacuous verification. Although this classification is based on con-
ceptual rather than syntactical differences, the consistency conditions are generally simpler
than the obligations.
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The decomposition of properties PropProdCons and PropNoProd is illustrated in
figures 3.7 and 3.8 respectively. First, properties PropProdCons and PropNoProd are
decomposed into 4 obligations and 11 consistency conditions. Then, two out of the four























Figure 3.7: Decomposition tree of the producer-consumer property
3.7.1 Obligations
Obligation Ob1 says that the producer does not signal mispredict between its final write
and the consumer’s final read. Obligation Ob2 says that the producer does not signal
mispredict after the consumer’s final read. Together, these two obligations prevent bugs
whereby a consumer reads an incorrect speculative value from a producer. In the case that
a consumer is dependent upon the initial state (i.e., is not dependent on any older parcel),


















Figure 3.8: Decomposition tree of the no-producer property
Unlike the rest of the properties, obligations Ob1 and Ob3 address events in the past.
To break down these obligation into smaller properties about present and future time, we
introduce two additional predicates. The purpose of these predicates is to capture history
information about the writes to physical variables. The two predicates can be described
as follows:
1. Most-recent-write predicate: MRWrvavi p q means that the most recent write to a
physical variable vi has been made by a parcel p, and at the time of that write vi was
mapped to an architectural variable va.
2. Past-write predicate: PWrvavi p q means that a parcel p has written to a physical
variable vi at some point in the past and at the time of that write vi was mapped to
an architectural variable va.
Obligation Ob1 is decomposed into obligation Ob1a and consistency conditions Cn1b
andCn1c. ObligationOb1a uses the most-recent-write predicate to say that the consumer
makes its final read from a variable that was written to most recently by the producer.
The consistency conditions ensure that the most-recent-write predicate is consistent with
the behavior of the pipeline.
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Obligation Ob3 is decomposed into obligation Ob3a and consistency condition Cn3b.
Obligation Ob3a uses the past-write predicate to ensure that no parcel has written to the
variable from which the consumer does its final read. The consistency condition describes
the required characteristics of the past-write predicate.
The final obligation (obligation Ob4) says that if a parcel should read an architectural
variable, then it performs the read before retirement. The obligations are described in
more detail over the rest of this subsection.
Ob1‡: No misprediction is signaled between producer’s final write and con-
sumer’s final read.
If a parcel p2 makes its final read for an architectural variable va using a physical
variable vi, and at the time p2 retires there exists a direct dependency from a parcel
p1 to p2 with respect to va, then before the current state there exists a write for the
value of va made to vi by p1. From that state at which p1 writes to vi, p1 shall not
signal mispredict on the value of va.








∧ X (¬Rdva p2 U (¬Rd
va p2 ∧ Retire p2 ∧ DDep
va p1 p2))
=⇒
X̂ ((¬Wrva ∧ ¬Mpva p1 ∧ (Infl p1 ∨ Ret p1)) Û (Wr
va
vi






Ob2: No misprediction is signaled after consumer’s final read.
If a parcel p2 makes a final read for the value of an architectural variable va using a
physical variable vi, and at the time p2 retires there exists a direct dependency from
a parcel p1 to p2 with respect to va, then p1 must not signal mispredict on the value
of va.








∧ X (¬Rdva p2 U (¬Rd
va p2 ∧ Retire p2 ∧ DDep
va p1 p2))
=⇒







Ob1 is decomposed into Ob1a, Cn1b and Cn1c.
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Ob3§: No writes happen before consumer’s final read.
If a parcel p2 makes a final read for the value of an architectural variable va using a
physical variable vi, and at the time p2 retires it has no dependencies with respect to
va, there exists no writes to vi prior to the current state.
















Ob4: Source is read before retirement.
If a parcel p enters the pipeline, then starting from the next state, p shall not retire
before reading va if va is marked as its source at retirement time.
∀ p.
G (Fetch p =⇒ X (¬(Retire p ∧ Srcva p) W Rdva p))
Ob1a: Consumer makes its final read from a variable where the most recent
write to that variable is made by producer.
If a parcel p2 makes a final read for the value of an architectural variable va using a
physical variable vi, and at the time p2 retires there exists a direct dependency from
a parcel p1 to p2 with respect to va, then the most recent write to vi must have been
done by p1.








∧ X (¬Rdva p2 U (¬Rd









Ob3a: Consumer’s final read is made from a variable to which no parcel has
written.
If a parcel p2 makes a final read for the value of an architectural variable va using a
§
Ob3 is decomposed into Ob3a and Cn3b.
79
physical variable vi, and at the time p2 retires it has no dependencies with respect to
va, then in the current state vi shall not be marked with any past writes.

















Consistency conditions Cn1b, Cn1c and Cn3b describe the relationship between the
write predicate, and the most-recent-write and past-write predicates. Together, conditions
Cn1b and Cn1c guarantee that the most-recent-write predicate is reset when the parcel
is fetched, becomes true after the parcel writes, and stays true unless another parcel writes
or a misprediction is signaled. Condition Cn3b ensures that the past-write predicate holds
once the parcel writes.
The main characteristics of the parcel order are described by consistency conditions
Cn5 and Cn6. The first condition states that parcel order shall be fixed over time. The
second condition says that when a parcel is fetched, no younger parcels shall be in-flight.
Consistency conditions Cn7 through Cn10 address the relationship between different
phase predicates. Condition Cn7 says that an in-flight parcel cannot be in the retired
phase. Conditions Cn8 and Cn9 imply that retired parcels and discarded parcels never
become in-flight. Similarly, condition Cn10 says that a discarded parcel cannot become
retired.
Consistency conditions Cn11 and Cn12 describe how the phase of a parcel changes
when it enters or exits the pipeline respectively. Condition Cn11 says that a parcel needs
to be in the top phase before it becomes in-flight. Condition Cn12 states that when a
parcel ceases to be in-flight, it either becomes retired or discarded.
The dependency predicates are the focus of consistency conditions Cn13 and Cn14.
Condition Cn13 says that when there is a direct dependency between two parcels on one
of the architectural variables, the producer shall be the older parcel and the variable shall
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be the source of the consumer. Condition Cn14 states that if the no-dependency predicate
holds for a parcel on one of the architectural variables, the variable shall be the source of
that parcel.
The last consistency condition Cn15 ensures that when an architectural variable is
read by a parcel, there exists a corresponding physical variable from which the read is
made. The rest of this subsection has more details about the consistency conditions.
Cn1b: Most-recent-write predicate is set to false at fetch time.
If at the current state a parcel p enters the pipeline, then in the next state p shall
not be marked as the parcel which made the most recent write to a physical variable
vi which is mapped to an architectural variable va.
∀ vi, va, p.
G (Fetch p =⇒ X ¬MRWrvavi p)
Cn1c: Most-recent-write predicate becomes true after write and stays true
unless another parcel writes or a misprediction is signaled.
If in the next state a parcel p is marked as the parcel making the most recent writer
to a physical variable vi mapped to an architectural variable va, then in the current
state, either p writes to vi, or else three conditions shall hold: p is marked as the
parcel making the most recent write to vi, p does not signal mispredict on the value
va, and no other parcel writes to vi.
∀ vi, va, p.
G (X MRWrvavi p =⇒Wr
va
vi
p ∨ (MRWrvavi p ∧ ¬Mp
va p ∧ ¬Wrvi))
Cn3b: Past-write predicate is set to true after any write.
If a parcel writes to a physical variable vi or vi is marked with a past write, then vi
shall be marked with a past write in the next state.
∀ vi.
G ((PWrvi ∨Wrvi) =⇒ X PWrvi )
Cn5: Parcel order does not change over time.
If in the next state a parcel p1 comes in order before a parcel p2, the same shall be
true in the current state.
∀ p1, p2.
G (X p1 ≺ p2 =⇒ p1 ≺ p2)
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Cn6: None of the younger parcels are in-flight at fetch time.
If a parcel p1 enters the pipeline, in the next state the phase of every younger parcel
p2 shall not be in-flight.
∀ p1, p2.
G (Fetch p1 ∧ p1 ≺ p2 =⇒ X ¬Infl p2)
Cn7: In-flight implies not retired.
If a parcel p is in the in-flight phase, it can not be in the retired phase.
∀ p.
G (Infl p =⇒ ¬Ret p)
Cn8: Retired parcel never becomes in-flight.
If a parcel p is in the retired phase, it never becomes in-flight.
∀ p.
G (Ret p =⇒ G ¬Infl p)
Cn9: Discarded parcels never become in-flight.
If a parcel p is in the discarded phase, it never becomes in-flight.
∀ p.
G (Dis p =⇒ G ¬Infl p)
Cn10: Discarded parcels never become retired.
If a parcel p is in the discarded phase, it shall not be in the retired phase.
∀ p.
G (Dis p =⇒ G ¬Ret p)
Cn11: Only parcels in top may become in-flight.
For a parcel p to change its phase to become in-flight in the next state, it has to be
currently in the top phase.
∀ p.
G (¬Infl p ∧ X Infl p =⇒ Top p)
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Cn12: In-flight changes to retired or discarded.
If an in-flight parcel p changes its phase in the next state, it becomes either retired
or discarded.
∀ p.
G (Infl p ∧ X ¬Infl p =⇒ X (Ret p ∨ Dis p))
Cn13: Direct-dependency predicate is stronger than source predicate.
If there is a direct dependency from one parcel p1 to another parcel p2 with respect
to an architectural variable va at the time p2 retires, then p1 shall come before p2 in
order and va shall be a (final) source of p2.
∀ va, p1, p2.
G (DDepva p1 p2 ∧ Retire p2 =⇒ p1 ≺ p2 ∧ Src
va p2)
Cn14: No-dependency predicate is stronger than source predicate.
If a parcel p has no dependencies with respect to an architectural variable va at the
time it retires, then va shall be marked as a (final) source of p.
∀ va, p.
G (NoDepva p ∧ Retire p =⇒ Srcva p)
Cn15: Reading an architectural variable is made from a physical variable
mapped to it.
If a parcel p reads an architectural variable va, there exists a physical variable vi from
which p reads the value of va and vi is mapped to va.
∀ va, p.




3.8 Soundness of Decomposition
In this section, we show that verifying the obligations and consistency conditions presented
in section 3.7 guarantees the satisfaction of the inter-parcel dependency properties defined
in section 3.6, namely, the producer-consumer (PropProdCons) and the no-producer
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(PropNoProd) properties. More precisely, we justify the soundness of the decomposition
trees associated with the two inter-parcel dependency properties and shown in figures 3.7
and 3.8 respectively.
In figure 3.9, we sketch a proof to show that the obligations imply the producer-
consumer property (PropProdCons). The premises of our proof are the four precon-
ditions of PropProdCons (steps 1-4). Given the obligations and the premises, we prove
that there exists a physical variable vi (representing the architectural variable va) through
which the producing parcel p1 passes uncorrupted data to the consuming parcel p2.
We first show that va shall be marked as a final source of p2 at the time it retires (step
5). At that time, p1 must come in order before p2 (step 6) and that is true also at the time
p1 enters the pipeline (step 7). Consequently, at the time p1 becomes in-flight, p2 shall not
be in-flight (step 8). p2 enters the pipeline in a following state (step 9) and its phase turns
in-flight and stays so until it retires (step 10). Before it retires, p2 has to make a final read
of the value of va (step 11) through some physical variable vi (step 12).
Similarly, once p1 enters the pipeline its phase becomes in-flight and stays so until it
exits (step 13). During that window and before p2 makes its final read, p1 shall make a
final write for the value of va to vi (step 14). Between the write and the read no parcel
writes to vi (step 15). After the write, p1 does not signal mispredict on the value of va
(steps 16-17).
Our proof for the soundness of decomposing the no-producer property (PropNoProd)
is sketched in figure 3.10. The proof premises are the three preconditions of PropNoProd.
The goal is to show that satisfying the preconditions, the obligations, and the consistency
conditions guarantees the existence of a physical variable vi (representing the architectural
variable va) whose initial value is not altered by any parcel and from which the consuming
parcel p2 makes its final read.
First, we show that the phase of p2 has to be in-flight as long as p2 is being processed by
the pipeline (step 4). At the time p2 retires, va shall be its final source (step 5). Therefore,
before its retirement, p2 makes a final read for the value of va (step 6) from one of the
physical variables, namely vi (step 7). Finally, it is shown that before the read takes place,
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Figure 3.10: Sketch of decomposition proof of the no-producer property
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3.9 Summary
Correctness of a pipeline is specified in terms of the behavior of its parcels. A pipeline
is instrumented with predicates to monitor some parcel activities such as reading from or
writing to the physical variables. Using this instrumentation, inter-parcel correctness is
expressed in the form of two properties that support speculative out-of-order processing
of parcels. The two properties are decomposed into 4 obligations and 14 consistency
conditions. The obligations detect implementation bugs while the consistency conditions





We conducted a case study to illustrate our verification techniques (presented in chapters
2 and 3) and evaluate their effectiveness. We implemented a tool, named Tahrir, aimed
at verifying syntactically-safe LTL (SSLTL) properties using the algorithm explained in
section 2.2. We used Tahrir to verify that the inter-parcel properties introduced in sec-
tion 3.6 are satisfied by a processor. The processor chosen for our case study supports
speculative out-of-order execution of instructions. Structural hazards and functionality of
the execution units are abstracted away from the processor model since the focus is on
verifying inter-instruction dependencies.
Tahrir is introduced in section 4.1. The microarchitecture of the processor is presented
in section 4.2. The processor model is explained in section 4.3. The verification is described
in section 4.4. An analysis of the verification can be found in section 4.5. The chapter is
summarized in section 4.6.
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4.1 SSLTL Verification Tool - Tahrir
In this section, we present Tahrir ∗, a tool aimed at inductively verifying syntactically-safe
LTL (SSLTL) properties about infinite-state systems. Tahrir implements the algorithm
presented in section 2.2 (function Verify). Tahrir has a generic interface at its core that
allows using an SMT solver (or invariant checker) as a decision procedure. Both CVC3
[3] and UCLID [6] are currently supported. Apart from its decision engine, Tahrir is
implemented in more than 6000 lines of Moscow ML [50] code.
Tahrir takes as input a model to be verified and a set of SSLTL properties about that
model. In addition to that, the user needs to set the induction depth (k) and choose which
decision procedure is to be used by Tahrir. For each property p, the user needs to provide
a proof statement through which the arguments of p (if they exist) can be bound with
a universal quantifier. The proof statement includes lists of lemmas and assumptions to
be used in proving the target invariant (i.e., ep in section 2.2) by induction. In the base
case of the induction, the assumptions are used to prove that the model satisfies the target
invariant in the initial k− 1 states. In the inductive case, the assumptions and lemmas are
combined to show that the model satisfy the target invariant in the kth step.
The following is an example of a proof statement:
PSTMT1: PROVE FORALL(x,y). p(x,y)
USING FORALL(v, w). l1(v), l2(x, y), l3(v, w)
ASSUMING FORALL(u). a1(u), a2(x)
where p is the (target) property to be verified using l1, l2 and l3 as lemmas, and a1 and a2
as assumptions. Typically, both the assumptions and lemmas are SSLTL formulas of the
formG φ where φ is purely combinational (i.e., φ does not contain any temporal operators).
However, the use of generic SSLTL formulas instead is not syntactically restricted.
Generally, a proof statement may contain up to three sets of variables bound by univer-
sal quantification. In the case of PSTMT1, these three sets are {x, y}, {v, w}, and {u}. We
define the number of outer quantifiers (NOQ) to be the number of variables in the first set
∗Our tool is named after Tahrir Square (Liberation Square), a major public town square in downtown
Cairo, Egypt. Tahrir Square was the epicenter of the Egyptian revolution triggered on January 25, 2011.
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while the number of inner quantifiers (NIQ) to be the number of variables that belong to
the other two sets. For instance, The numbers NOQ and NIQ for proof statement PSTMT1
are two and three respectively.
The modeling language of Tahrir is based on that of UCLID. The language has four na-
tive datatypes: TRUTH (Boolean), TERM (unbounded integers), PRED[n] (n-ary predicates
where n ∈ N+), and FUNC[n] (n-ary functions where n ∈ N+). Creating enumerated
datatypes is also supported in the language. Both native and enumerated datatypes can
be used in defining the model variables and inputs with the exception that inputs have to
be of 0-ary datatypes. Symbolic constants can be defined using native datatypes.
Expressions of type TRUTH can be built using relational operators (e.g., < and >),
Boolean operators (e.g., ∧ and ∨), and predicate applications (e.g., p(x, y) where p is of
type PRED[2]). Function applications can be used in constructing expressions of type TERM
as well as enumerated types. Expressions for predicates and functions are represented as
lambda expressions (e.g., Lambda(x, y).x > y).
The behavior of the model is specified as a set of expressions assigned to its variables.
Each combinational variable is assigned a single expression that represents its value in the
current state. Each state variable can be assigned two expressions: one to represent its
initial value and another to represent its value in the next state.
The ultimate goal of Tahrir is to check whether the language of the model is contained
in the language of the Büchi automaton that is constructed from an SSLTL property.
To achieve this goal, Tahrir follows the algorithm explained in section 2.2. First, Tahrir
translates the property into a Büchi automaton. Then, for each state in the Büchi au-
tomaton, the model is augmented with a Boolean (history) variable to keep track of that
state. This encoding of states (as Boolean variables) is used because the automaton is
non-deterministic and the encoding allows us easily to represent the automaton being in
multiple states at the same time.
Based on Theorem 2.1, for language containment to hold, it shall be always the case
that at least one of the history variables, representing the states of the generated Büchi
automaton, is true. We refer to this as the target invariant (i.e., ep in section 2.2). For
SSLTL properties of the formG e, where e does not contain any temporal operators, Tahrir
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considers e to be the target invariant. For this type of property, Tahrir does not generate
a Büchi automaton and adds no history variables to the model.
With other forms of properties (i.e., other than G e), Tahrir constructs the Büchi
automaton using the basic algorithm proposed by Gerth et al. [18]. After that Tahrir
tries to minimize the size of the automaton by merging the states which have identical
predecessors or successors. During this step, Tahrir repeatedly calls the SAT solver zChaff
[46] to identify pairs of matching states. The minimized version of the automaton is then
used to generate the target invariant.
Tahrir verifies whether the target invariant is indeed an invariant using k-step induction.
In the base case, Tahrir simulates the model for k−1 steps from the initial states and calls
the SMT solver to check whether the target invariant is satisfied in each step. The actual
Boolean formula that gets checked by the SMT solver is generated taking into consideration
the list of assumptions (specified in the proof statement) as well as the target invariant.
For instance, the Boolean formula that gets generated in the base case for proof statement
PSTMT1 is:
∀ x, y. (∀ u. a1|
k−1
0 (u) ∧ a2|
k−1
0 (x)) =⇒ p|
k−1
0 (x, y)
where φ|nm represents the invariant generated from a property φ and expanded over steps
m through n. In other words, it is the conjunction of all the instances of the invariant from
step m to step n.
In the inductive case, Tahrir simulates the model for k steps starting from an uncon-
strained state. The SMT solver is called to check whether the target invariant is satisfied
in the kth step. The Boolean formula passed to the SMT solver includes the lemmas as
induction hypotheses to limit induction within the reachable state space. For instance, the
Boolean formula that gets generated in the inductive case for proof statement PSTMT1 is:





∧ (∀ v, w. l1|
k−1
0 (v) ∧ l2|
k−1




For flexibility, the target invariant is not considered as an induction hypothesis by
default, but instead, the user may include the target property (e.g., p in the case of
PSTMT1) as one of the lemmas in the proof statement.
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4.2 Processor Microarchitecture
Our aim in this section is to describe the microarchitecture of the processor to which we
apply our verification strategies presented in chapters 3 and 2. The microarchitecture
used in our case study supports two features found in most modern microprocessors: out-
of-order and speculative execution of instructions. We focus here on these two features
because of their strong impact on the way instruction dependencies are handled within a
microprocessor.
The microarchitecture presented here can be viewed as a six-stage pipeline. Some of
these pipeline stages may be pipelined and may produce instructions out of order. However,
at any point in time each stage receives and produces at most one instruction. The status
of the instructions flowing through the pipeline is held by a set of storage elements. Figure
4.1 shows the different pipeline stages and storage elements put together to build the
microarchitecture.
At a high level, the pipeline can be divided into three parts: a front-end, a process-
ing core, and a back-end. In the front-end (fetch/decode (FD) and rename (RN) stages),
instructions are processed in program order. Program order constraints are relaxed when
instructions get to the processing core (schedule/dispatch (SD), execute (EX), and re-
cover/bypass (RB) stages). Instructions are put back into program order when they reach
the back-end of the pipeline (write-back/retire (WR) stage). To explain in more detail the
functionality of all the blocks that show up in figure 4.1, we describe the journey of an
individual instruction I1 from the moment it is fetched until it retires.
The journey begins when the program counter (PC) points to the location of instruction
I1 in the instruction memory
† (IMEM). This is when the fetch/decode (FD) stage starts
fetching instruction I1 from IMEM. After fetching, the FD stage decodes instruction I1
into its main components (i.e., operation code, source operand(s), destination, etc). Based
on these components, the FD stage computes (maybe through prediction with some types
of instructions, e.g., when I1 is a conditional branch) the address of the next instruction to
†More accurately, we should refer to this as the instruction cache instead. However, the differences









































































Figure 4.1: An out-of-order speculative microarchitecture
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be fetched and updates the PC accordingly. At the end of this phase, the FD stage passes
the components of I1 to the rename (RN) stage through pipeline register FDRN.
The RN stage starts by assigning I1 a unique entry at the tail of the reorder buffer
(ROB). This is the location where most of the processing history of I1 is usually recorded.
Moreover, the index of that entry is used to identify I1 throughout the rest of its journey.
This index also reflects the relative age of I1 according to program order. The latter
information is needed to determine the time at which I1 is allowed to retire; normally,
instructions retire in fetch order (i.e., program order).
The RN stage uses the main register alias table (RAT) in mapping the indices of the
source registers of I1 to their most recent producing instructions identified by their ROB
entries; this is what is known as register renaming. The main RAT is updated to reflect
that I1 is now the most recent instruction that writes to the destination register. The RN
stage might need to save a snapshot of the main RAT (after update) to one of the unused
RATs. Creating a backup copy of the main RAT at this point helps the pipeline later
recover if the instructions processed after I1 turn out to be mispredicted. The renaming
phase ends by passing I1 to the schedule/dispatch (SD) stage through pipeline register
RNSD.
The SD stage keeps I1 in internal storage (typically known as a reservation station) until
all its source operands are ready. After that, I1 gets scheduled for later execution based on
the availability of the appropriate execution unit. At the time of dispatch, all the source
operands of I1 need to be read. The location from which a source operand is read depends
on whether the producing instruction is in-flight. As long as the producing instruction
is still in-flight, the value can be obtained from the ROB entry of the producing parcel
(forwarding) or the bypass register RBSD (bypassing) if possible. Otherwise, the value is
obtained from the register file (RF). After reading the source operands, I1 is dispatched
for execution by moving to pipeline register SDEX.
The EX stage carries out the operation specified by I1 and computes the result. This
result is then sent along with I1 to the recover/bypass (RB) stage through pipeline register
EXRB. The RB stage then uses I1’s result in confirming the predictions that may have
been made during the fetching phase of I1. If a misprediction is detected, the recovery
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takes place in three steps. First, the pipeline front-end is resteered by loading the PC
with the correct address of the instruction that follows I1. Second, the backup copy of the
RAT associated with I1 is restored. Last, all the instructions that are fetched after I1 are
invalidated. At the end of this phase, the result of I1 is saved to its ROB entry and copied
to the bypass register RBSD. By doing so, the result immediately becomes available to all
the consuming instructions through forwarding or bypassing.
By writing its result to the ROB, I1 transfers to its final processing phase during which
it waits for all preceding instructions to complete. It is only after that when I1 is permitted
to retire by the write-back/retire (WR) stage. The result of I1 is then committed to the
RF and all the pipeline resources allocated to I1, e.g., ROB entry and backup RAT, are
freed.
4.3 Implementing the Microarchitecture
In this section we introduce the processor model verified in our case study. The model
implements the microarchitecture presented in section 4.2. However it abstracts away some
of the details that may be irrelevant in verifying instruction dependencies. For instance
structural hazards cannot occur in the model because it uses unbounded storage elements.
Also the model uses a simplified instruction format where each instruction has only one
source operand. Instruction operation codes are grouped into two abstract types: branch
and arithmetic. Also the model uses uninterpreted functions in representing some of the
irrelevant hardware modules such as the functional units and the decoding logic.
For the purpose of this thesis, we elaborate on how the storage elements are represented
using the modeling language of Tahrir. Figure 4.2 illustrates the structure of each storage
element. Most of the datatypes used here are native datatypes (see section 4.1 for details).
The only exceptions are the two enumerated datatypes: OP and PH. OP represents the
different types of instructions, in this case we have only two abstract operation codes: qBRq
(branch) and qARq (arithmetic). PH represents the different processing phases, i.e., qFDq,
qRNq, etc.
The PC is modeled as a variable of type TERM. The bypass register (RBSD) and the
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PC: TERM
Bubble: TRUTH OpCode: OP DstIdx: TERM SrcIdx: TERM
Bubble: TRUTH InstId: TERM Bubble: TRUTH InstId: TERM
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RBSD
Figure 4.2: Storage elements of the processor model
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pipeline registers (FDRN, RNSD, SDEX, and EXRB) are each composed of several fields
which carry relevant information about the instruction held by the register. The field
Bubble, which can be found in every pipeline register, indicates whether the register cur-
rently holds a bubble (i.e., does not hold not an instruction). The other fields in the FDRN
register are aimed at holding the instruction components resulted from decoding. The field
InstID, found in the rest of the pipeline registers as well as in the bypass register, is used
to carry the instruction identifier, which is also a pointer to the ROB entry associated with
the instruction. The execution results of an instruction exiting the EX stage is saved to the
field Rslt in both the EXRB and RBSD registers. The field Valid in the RBSD register
is initialized to false and becomes true once a result is copied to the register.
IMEM is modeled as a one-argument function (IMEM) that maps each address to one of
the program instructions. The RF is similarly modeled as a one-argument function (RF),
yet in this case RF is a map from the identifiers (indices) of the architectural registers to the
data held by these registers. The RATs are built out of three components: Busy, InstID,
and Main. Each component takes two arguments. The first argument selects one of the
RATs. The second argument is an index within that RAT. Busy(i, j) decides whether,
according to the ith RAT, there exists an instruction among those in-flight that writes to
the architectural register j. InstID(i, j) identifies the in-flight instruction behind the most
recent write to the architectural register j (according to the ith RAT). The third component
(Main) is a pointer to the main RAT, the one used during the register renaming phase.
The last storage element illustrated in figure 4.2 is the ROB. The ROB is implemented
as a typical First-In-First-Out (FIFO) queue. Instructions enter the ROB from one end
(pointed to by the tail pointer Tail) and exit from the other end (pointed to by the head
pointer Head). Both the tail and head pointers are initialized with the index of the first
ROB entry (FirstID). Tail is incremented each time an instruction enters the ROB while
Head is incremented whenever an instruction exits the ROB. Empty is a flag set to true if
and only if none of the ROB entries is currently occupied by any instruction.
Every ROB entry has twelve fields each of which holds history information about the
associated instruction. PredPC is assigned the value of the PC when the instruction enters
the RN stage. At the same time, the instruction components resulting from decoding are
saved to OpCode, DstIdx, and SrcIdx. The information extracted from the RAT when
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renaming the source register is kept in SrcBusy and SrcInstID. The identifier of the RAT
used for renaming the instruction operands is saved to Main. SrcVal stores the value of
the source operand after dispatch. After execution, instruction result is saved to Rslt, and
RsltRdy is set to true. Phase indicates the current processing phase of the instruction.
Finally, Invalid is a flag set when the instruction is canceled (invalidated).
The storage elements explained above are initialized such that the only instruction
processed by the model is the one currently being fetched. This means that, firstly, none of
the ROB entries are occupied by any instructions, i.e., ROB.Head and ROB.Tail are equal,
and ROB.Empty is true. Secondly, none of the pipeline registers holds any instructions,
i.e., none of the following variables is true: FDRN.Bubble, RNSD.Bubble, SDEX.Bubble, and
EXRB.Bubble. Thirdly, none of the entries of the main RAT is marked busy, i.e., for every
integer x, RATs.Busy(RATs.Main, x) must not hold. Lastly, the value kept in the bypass
register is marked invalid, i.e., RBSD.Valid is false. All other storage elements are initially
assigned non-deterministic (arbitrary) values.
4.4 Verifying Inter-instruction Dependencies
In this section, we show how we verify whether the processor model explained in section
4.3 satisfies the inter-parcel dependency obligations and consistency conditions presented
in section 3.7. As mentioned before, a mechanism for identifying parcels in the model is
required to be able to use the inter-parcel dependency properties. This mechanism has
to include an infinite set of parcel identifiers P and a total order ≺ defined over the set
such that it reflects the age of parcels. Since parcels are instructions in this context, and
instructions are identified in the model using ROB indices, we define P to be the set of
ROB indices, i.e., {y | y ∈ Z ∧ y ≥ FirstID}. The less-than relation < over integers is
used as a total order over parcel identifiers since ROB indices are integer numbers reflecting
the order at which instructions are fetched.
In order to instantiate the inter-parcel dependency properties for the processor model,
we need to define the set of architectural variables and identify which physical variables
are architecturally visible. A physical variable is architecturally visible if and only if it
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is used to exchange values representing architectural variables between parcels. Since the
register file and the program counter are the only two architectural elements in the model,
the set of architectural variables Va is defined to be {PC} ∪ {RFx | x ∈ Z}.
The physical variables which are architecturally visible are identified by inspecting the
model and determining which variables are mapped to the architectural variables and used
for inter-parcel communications. The architectural program counter and register file are
explicitly represented in the model by the two storage elements PC and RF respectively.
Further inspection of the model reveals that instructions can exchange (read/write) the
values of their operands through EXSD.Rslt and ROB.Rslt as well as RF. Therefore, we
define the set of physical variables which are architecturally visible V ai to be {RFx | x ∈
Z} ∪ {PC, EXSD} ∪ {ROBy | y ∈ Z ∧ y ≥ FirstID}.
To verify that the model satisfies the inter-parcel dependency properties, we check
all the possible instances of each property generated using the two sets V ai and Va. For
example, to verify obligation Ob1a, we check four instances of Ob1a in which the two
bound variables (va, vi) are substituted by (PC, PC), (RFx, RFx), (RFx, ROBy), or (RFx, EXSD)




Ob1aRFxROBy , and Ob1a
RFx
EXSD, respectively.
As another example, to verify the consistency condition Cn15, we check the two in-
stances Cn15PC and Cn15RFx where the variable va is replaced by PC and RFx respec-
tively. Since the only possible value for the variable vi is PC, the existential quantifica-
tion can be removed and vi can be simply substituted by PC. In other words, Cn15
PC
can be rewritten as: G (RdPC p =⇒ RdPCPC p). Similarly, Cn15
RFx can be rewritten as:
G (RdRFx p =⇒ RdRFxRFx p ∨ Rd
RFx
EXSD p ∨ Rd
RFx
ROBy
p), since in this case vi shall represent one of
the physical variables that are mapped to RFx.
In the rest of this section, we explain how the instrumentation predicates are defined in
terms of the state variables of the model (subsection 4.4.1). We also describe the lemmas




Most of the information needed for defining the instrumentation predicates is directly
extracted from the model. In the few cases where the required information is missing,
the state of the model is augmented using history variables. For instance, the model does
not keep track of which instruction has recently updated the program counter. Since this
information is needed to define some predicates such as MRWrPC and PWrPC , we add
a history variable Hist.PCWriter (of type TERM) to the model in order to memorize that
piece of information. Variable Hist.PCWriter is initialized to some constant value NotID
and updated with the ID of an instruction when it writes to the program counter. The
constant value NotID should not match any of the instruction IDs. In other words, NotID
must be outside the range of ROB indices, i.e., NotID must be less than FirstID.
Similarly, we add a history variable Hist.RFWriter (of type FUNC[1]) to map each entry
in the register file to the ID of the instruction which has most recently written to that entry.
The last history variable, namely Hist.PrevInst (of type FUNC[1]), is used to identify for
any given instruction which instruction precedes it in program order.
Before defining the instrumentation predicates, we introduce a few shortcuts to help
make the predicate definitions more readable. Each shortcut is a combinational variable
(of type TRUTH) defined in terms of the state variables of the model. Variable Shct.Mispred
is set to true if and only if a misprediction is detected by the instruction exiting the EX
unit. Variables Shct.Alloc and Shct.Dealloc mark the states at which an entry in the
ROB is either allocated or released respectively. Variable Shct.Full becomes true if and
only if all the entries in the ROB are occupied. Variable Shct.XFull reflects whether the
ROB is about to become fully occupied in the next state (i.e., whether Shct.Full is true
in the next state).
Shct.Mispred ≡ ¬ROB.Invalid(EXRB.InstID)
∧ ¬EXRB.Bubble
∧ ROB.OpCode(EXRB.InstID) = qBRq
∧ ¬(ROB.PredPC(EXRB.InstID) = EXRB.Rslt)
Shct.Alloc ≡ ¬FDRN.Bubble ∧ ¬Shct.Mispred
Shct.Dealloc ≡ ¬ROB.Empty ∧ ROB.RsltRdy(ROB.Head)
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Shct.Full ≡ ¬ROB.Empty ∧ ROB.Head = ROB.Tail
Shct.XFull ≡ (ROB.Head = ROB.Tail+ 1 ∧ Shct.Alloc ∧ ¬Shct.Dealloc)
∨ (Shct.Full ∧ (Shct.Dealloc⇐⇒ Shct.Alloc))
In the remaining part of this subsection (4.4.1), we explain how the instrumentation
predicates are defined for the processor model considered in our case study. We classify the
predicates into three categories. The first category contains the phase predicates. Under
the second category, we include all the predicates related to the architectural program
counter and it physical version. The third category contains all the predicates related to
the architectural register file and its physical representation in the model (i.e., RF, result
field of the ROB, and EXSD register).
Phase Predicates
The instrumentation predicates are meant to capture some milestones in the lifetime of a
parcel. Defining those predicates for a given pipeline requires an understanding of how a
parcel interacts with the pipeline state variables (i.e., storage elements or physical vari-
ables) during its journey through the pipeline.
Determining the set of parcels which are in-flight at any given moment is a key in
defining the phase predicates. For the processor model under consideration, those parcels
are the instructions which are being processed by the different pipeline stages. At any
given state, two of the in-flight instructions are processed in the front-end of the processor.
These two instructions are identified by the indices ROB.tail and ROB.tail+1 since these
indices refer to the two ROB entries that will be eventually allocated to the instructions
once they pass the front-end. The rest of the in-flight instructions (processed either at the
core or the back-end) can be identified by the indices of the ROB entries which are busy.
These indices range from ROB.head up to ROB.tail− 1.
A parcel p is in-flight (i.e., Infl p holds) if and only if p is an index within ROB.head and
ROB.tail + 1. ROB indices greater than ROB.tail + 1 represent parcels in the top phase
since these indices refer to the ROB entries which will eventually be used by instructions yet
to be processed. On the other hand, the indices of the ROB which are less than ROB.Head
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represent parcels that exited the pipeline (i.e., instructions that finished execution). The
final phase of each of these parcels can be determined based on the value of the Invalid
bit of the associated ROB entry. A value of true means that parcel is discarded, otherwise
it is retired.
Infl p ≡ p≥ ROB.Head ∧ p ≤ ROB.Tail+ 1
Top p ≡ p> ROB.Tail+ 1
Ret p ≡ p< ROB.Head ∧ ¬ROB.Invalid(p)
Dis p ≡ p< ROB.Head ∧ ROB.Invalid(p)
The processor model fetches and/or retires at most one instruction at any given state.
For an instruction to be fetched (i.e., a parcel to enter the pipeline), the FDRN register
has to hold an instruction and no misprediction has to be signaled. The identity of the
instruction being fetched is ROB.Tail+ 2, because this index refers to the ROB entry that
the instruction will occupy. On the other hand, the identity of an instruction when it
is about to exit the pipeline is ROB.Head, because this represents the oldest instruction
in-flight. For an instruction to retire, it has to have its result ready and its ROB entry
valid.
Fetch p ≡ p= ROB.Tail+ 2 ∧ ¬FDRN.Bubble ∧ ¬Shct.Mispred
Retire p ≡ p = ROB.Head ∧ p < ROB.Tail
∧ ROB.RsltRdy(p) ∧ ¬ROB.Invalid(p)
Program Counter Predicates
Since each instruction needs to read the PC (at least once) to determine which instruction to
be fetched next, the PC can be viewed as a source of data for every instruction. Therefore,
the source predicate is defined such that SrcPC p is true regardless of the value of p. Similarly,
the address-map predicate AMPCPC is defined to be true. This means that the physical
PC (i.e., the physical variable named PC) is statically mapped to the architectural PC
regardless of the current state of the processor.
SrcPC p ≡ True
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AMPCPC ≡ True
The direct-dependency predicate is defined such that DDepPC p1 p2 holds if and only
if three conditions are satisfied. First, the ID of the producer instruction p1 is one of the
ROB indices. Second, the PC is a source of data for the consumer instruction p2, which
trivially holds by definition of the source predicate. Third, p1 is the instruction which
directly precedes p2. On the other hand, the no-dependency predicate is defined such that
NoDepPC p holds if and only if the PC is a source for instruction p and there is no producer-
consumer relationship between p and the instruction that precedes it. In this case p has
to be the first instruction to be processed.
DDepPC p1 p2 ≡ FirstID< p1 ∧ Src
PC p2 ∧ Hist.PrevInst(p2) = p1
NoDepPC p ≡ SrcPC p ∧ ¬DDepPC Hist.PrevInst(p) p
The definition of the read predicate for the physical PC (RdPC) has two cases. Each case
addresses one of the two instructions processed in the front-end (ROB.Tail and ROB.Tail+
1), since these are the only instructions that would need to read the PC (to determine the
next instruction to be fetched). In both cases, for the read to take place, the ROB shall
not be about to become full and no misprediction shall be signaled. If the FDRN register
carries a bubble then the read is done by the older instruction ROB.Tail, otherwise the
read is done by ROB.Tail + 1. The definition of the read predicate for the architectural
PC (RdPC) is identical to RdPC because, as mentioned earlier, the physical PC is statically
mapped to the architectural PC.
RdPC p ≡ (p = ROB.Tail ∧ ¬Shct.Mispred
∧ ¬Shct.XFull ∧ FDRN.Bubble)
∨ (p = ROB.Tail+ 1 ∧ ¬Shct.Mispred
∧ ¬Shct.XFull ∧ ¬FDRN.Bubble)
RdPC p ≡ RdPC p
The definition of the write predicate for the physical PC (WrPC) is similar to that of the
read predicate with the exception that it adds an extra case. This extra case addresses the
corrective write which happens when a misprediction is detected. In this case the write
is done by the instruction which has just exited the EX stage and hence identified by the
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value of EXRB.InstID. The write predicate for the architectural PC (WrPC) is defined to be
equal to WrPC for the same reason mentioned earlier in explaining the definition of Rd
PC.
The misprediction predicate is defined such that MpPC p holds if and only if p is the ID of
the instruction held by the EXRB register and p writes to the PC.
WrPC p ≡ (p = ROB.Tail ∧ ¬Shct.Mispred
∧ ¬Shct.XFull ∧ FDRN.Bubble)
∨ (p = ROB.Tail+ 1 ∧ ¬Shct.Mispred
∧ ¬Shct.XFull ∧ ¬FDRN.Bubble)
∨ (p = EXRB.InstID ∧ Shct.Mispred)
WrPC p ≡ WrPC p
WrPC ≡ WrPC ROB.Tail ∨WrPC ROB.Tail+ 1 ∨WrPC EXRB.InstID
MpPC p ≡ ¬EXRB.Bubble ∧ p = EXRB.InstID ∧WrPC p
The predicate which captures the most recent write to the physical PC can be defined
such that MRWrPC p is true if and only if p is the value recorded in the history vari-
able Hist.PCWriter and p belongs to the set of ROB indices. The past-write predicate
(PWrPC ) can be defined on top of the most-recent-write predicate by fixing p to the value
of Hist.PCWriter. This means that PWrPC holds if and only if the value of the history
variable Hist.PCWriter equals one of the ROB indices.
MRWrPC p ≡ p≥ FirstID ∧ p = Hist.PCWriter
PWrPC ≡ MRWrPC Hist.PCWriter
Register File Predicates
Each entry in the physical register file is statically mapped to the corresponding architec-
tural register. Therefore, the address-map predicate for the physical register file (AMRFxRFz) is
defined to hold if and only if z is the same as x. On the other hand, the ROB entries and the
EXSD register are dynamically mapped to the architectural registers. A ROB entry ROBj
is mapped to an architectural register RFz if and only if the destination index of instruction
j is z. Similarly, the EXSD register is mapped to RFz if and only if the destination index
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of the instruction whose result is held in EXSD is z. The mispredict predicate (MpRFz )
is defined to be false because the processor does not support executing instructions using
speculative values for their operands (i.e., data speculation or value prediction).
AMRFxRFz ≡ z= x
AMRFzROBj ≡ z= ROB.DstIdx(j)
AMRFzEXSD ≡ z= ROB.DstIdx(EXSD.InstID)
MpRFz ≡ False
Realizing that instructions read source their operands as they exit the SD stage is key
in defining the read predicates RdRFz , RdROBj , and RdEXSD. More precisely, for each of these
predicates to hold for an instruction p, p has to be in the SDEX register. The status of
the instruction producing the source operand of p determines the location of the read and
as a consequence which one of the three predicates is true. If the producer is no longer
in-flight, the value of the source operand is obtained from the RF, and hence RdRFz p is
true. Otherwise, RdEXSD p is true if the source operand is available in the SDEX register,
else, the source operand shall be read from the ROB and so RdROBz p is true. The read
predicate for architectural registers is simply defined such that RdRFz p holds if and only if
some physical location mapped to architectural register RFz is read by instruction p.
RdRFz p ≡ ¬SDEX.Bubble
∧ p = SDEX.InstID ∧ z = ROB.SrcIdx(p)
∧ ¬(ROB.SrcBusy(p)
∧ ROB.SrcInstID(p) ≥ ROB.Head
∧ ROB.SrcInstID(p) < ROB.Tail)
RdROBj p ≡ ¬SDEX.Bubble
∧ p = SDEX.InstID ∧ j = ROB.SrcInstID(p)
∧ (ROB.SrcBusy(p)
∧ ROB.SrcInstID(p) ≥ ROB.Head
∧ ROB.SrcInstID(p) < ROB.Tail)
∧ (EXSD.Bubble ∨ EXSD.InstID 6= ROB.SrcInstID(p))
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RdEXSD p ≡ ¬SDEX.Bubble
∧ p = SDEX.InstID
∧ (ROB.SrcBusy(p)
∧ ROB.SrcInstID(p) ≥ ROB.Head
∧ ROB.SrcInstID(p) < ROB.Tail)
∧ ¬EXSD.Bubble ∧ EXSD.InstID = ROB.SrcInstID(p)
RdRFz p ≡ RdRFz p
∨ RdROBROB.SrcInstID(p) p ∧ AM
RFz
ROBROB.SrcInstID(p)
∨ RdEXSD p ∧ AM
RFz
EXSD
There are two moments at which an instruction p writes a value to a physical location
mapped to its destination register. First, when p finishes execution, its result is written
to both its ROB entry ROBj (where p equals j) and the EXSD register. In this case both
WrROBj p and WrEXSD p shall be true. Second, when p retires, its result is written to the
RF entry RFz associated with its destination unless p has been invalidated. In this case
WrRFz p must be true. The write predicate for architectural registers is defined, in analogy
with the corresponding read predicate, such that WrRFz p holds if and only if p writes its
result to any of the physical locations mapped to architectural register RFz.
WrRFz p ≡ ¬ROB.Empty ∧ ROB.RsltRdy(p) ∧ ¬ROB.Invalid(p)
∧ p = ROB.Head ∧ z = ROB.DstIdx(p)
WrROBj p ≡ ¬EXRB.Bubble ∧ p = EXRB.InstID ∧ j = p
WrEXSD p ≡ ¬EXRB.Bubble ∧ p = EXRB.InstID
WrRFz p ≡ WrRFz p
∨WrROBp p ∧ AM
RFz
ROBp
The predicates which capture the anonymous writes to the three physical representa-
tions of the architectural registers can be expressed in terms of the write predicates defined
above. For instance, the predicate WrRFz is defined to be true if and only if the instruction
at the head of the ROB writes to RFz. On the other hand, the predicates WrROBj and
WrEXSD hold if and only if the instruction kept in the EXRB register writes to ROBj and
EXRB respectively.
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WrRFz ≡ WrRFz ROB.Head
WrROBj ≡ WrROBj EXRB.InstID
WrEXSD ≡ WrEXSD EXRB.InstID
The most-recent-write predicate associated with the RF is defined such that MRWrRFz p
is true if and only if p is the instruction which makes the most recent write to RFz and p
is a ROB index. The predicate associated with the ROB is defined such that MRWrROBj p
holds if instruction p occupies the entry ROBj and the result saved at that entry is ready.
For the EXSD, MRWrEXSD p shall hold if and only if p is the instruction whose result is in
the EXSD register and p is one of the ROB indices.
MRWrRFz p ≡ p= Hist.RFWriter(z) ∧ p ≥ FirstID
MRWrROBj p ≡ ROB.RsltRdy(p)∧ p < ROB.Tail ∧ p ≥ FirstID ∧ p = j
MRWrEXSD p ≡ ¬EXSD.Bubble ∧ p = EXSD.InstID ∧ p ≥ FirstID
The past-write predicate for the RF is defined to be true for an entry RFz if and only if
the history variable RFWriter(z) contains a ROB index. The past-write predicate for the
ROB and the EXSD register are defined to be true. The reason behind that is to make
sure that in these two cases obligation Ob3a is reduced to the negation of the precedent.
In other words, to satisfy Ob3a, an instruction cannot make its final read for the source
operand from neither the ROB nor the EXSD if that instruction does not depend on any
older instruction.
PWrRFz ≡ Hist.RFWriter(z)≥ FirstID
PWrROBj ≡ True
PWrEXSD ≡ True
The source predicate SrcRFz p holds if and only if z is the index of the source operand
of instruction p. For a pair of instructions p1 and p2, the direct-dependency predicate
shall be true if and only if RFz is the source operand of p2 and p1 is the producer. The
no-dependency predicate holds for an instruction p if and only if RFz is the source operand
of p, none of the in-flight instructions is a producer, and no instruction has written to RFz.
SrcRFz p ≡ p< ROB.Tail ∧ z = ROB.SrcIdx(p)
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DDepRFz p1 p2 ≡ Src
RFz p2
∧ ((ROB.SrcBusy(p2) ∧ p1 = ROB.SrcInstID(p2))
∨
(¬ROB.SrcBusy(p2) ∧ p1 = Hist.RFWriter(z)
∧ p1 ≥ FirstID))
NoDepRFz p ≡ SrcRFz p ∧ ¬ROB.SrcBusy(p) ∧ Hist.RFWriter(z) < FirstID
4.4.2 Lemmas and Assumptions
In verifying the inter-parcel dependency properties, we needed to make three assumptions.
One of these three assumptions states that the constant value NotID never matches the ID
of any instruction (i.e., an index in the ROB). Since ROB indices start at FirstID, we
simply assume that NotID is less than FirstID.
The other two assumptions specify the behavior of the two black-box stages SD and
EX respectively. One assumption restricts the SDEX register (which otherwise contains
a non-deterministic value) to instructions that are currently in-flight. It also makes sure
that the source operand of the instruction in the SDEX register is available in the RF, the
EXSD register, or the ROB. The other assumption targets the EXRB register and makes
sure it holds one of those in-flight instructions whose results are not yet ready.
Since Tahrir implements an inductive approach for verifying SSLTL properties, addi-
tional lemmas are typically needed to strengthen the inductive invariant, and hence, keep
induction within the reachable state-space. In verifying the inter-parcel dependency prop-
erties against the processor model, we needed (to verify) a total of 43 lemmas to exclude
unreachable states. These lemmas can be classified into three categories:
1. Lemmas relating the different state variables of the processor model (i.e., ROB fields,
pipeline registers, etc) to each other: a total of 19 lemmas belong to this category.
Lemmas Lm1 and Lm16 are detailed below for illustration.
Lm1: The ROB is not full and the head pointer is less than or equal to the tail
pointer
G (¬Shct.Full ∧ ROB.Head ≤ ROB.Tail)
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Lm16: If p is an in-flight branch instruction occupying an entry in the ROB and
p has neither produced a result nor been invalidated yet, then the ID of the










p< ROB.Tail ∧ p ≥ ROB.Head
∧ ¬ROB.Invalid(p) ∧ ¬ROB.RsltRdy(p)











2. Lemmas relating state variables of the processor model to history variables: this
category includes six lemmas. Lemma Lm20 is explained below as an example.
Lm20: If p identifies an in-flight instruction occupying an entry in the ROB, then
the ID of the preceding instruction either belongs to the set of ROB indices or






p< ROB.Tail ∧ p ≥ ROB.Head =⇒
Hist.PrevInst(p) < p




3. Lemmas relating the states of the Büchi automata (generated from the obligations)
to the state variables of the processor model: a total of 18 lemmas are classified under
this category. To illustrate these lemmas, we elaborate below on lemma Lm35 which
addresses the states of the Büchi automaton generated for obligation Ob3a, more
specifically its instance Ob3aPCPC. The Büchi automaton for that obligation is shown
in figure 4.3.
Lm35: If an instruction p is not in the state q0, p shall be less than or equal to
the index of the ROB tail. If p equals the tail index, either the FDRN register
does not carry an instruction or the ID of the preceding instruction is among
the set of ROB indices. Otherwise, either p does not currently depend on any
‡This implies that the RAT used at the time instruction p was in the RN stage is a past snapshot of
the current RAT.
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p = ROB.Tail ∧ (FDRN.Bubble ∨ Hist.PrevInst(p) ≥ FirstID)






¬RdPC p ∨ ¬PWrPC
True
RdPC p ∧ ¬RdPC p
∨ RdPC p ∧ ¬PWrPC
RdPC p ∨ ¬NoDepPC ∨ ¬Retire p
Figure 4.3: Büchi automaton for obligation Ob3aPCPC
4.5 Verification Remarks
The total number of properties verified in our case study is 83. These properties can be
divided into three categories:
• The first category contains 14 properties, all of which are instances of the inter-parcel



















Ob4PC Ob4RFx — —
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• The second category contains 26 properties. These properties represent all the in-
stances of the inter-parcel consistency conditions. The following is a list of all the



















Cn5 — — —
Cn6 — — —
Cn7 — — —
Cn8 — — —
Cn9 — — —
Cn10 — — —
Cn11 — — —
Cn12 — — —
Cn13PC Cn13RFx — —
Cn14PC Cn14RFx — —
Cn15PC Cn15RFx — —
• The third contains 43 properties. These properties are the lemmas introduced for the
purpose of limiting induction scope to reachable states. Examples of these lemmas
can be found in subsection 4.4.2.
The machine on which we ran our verification experiments is a Linux box that has a 3.2
MHz Intel dual-core processor with 3.4 GB of memory. The cumulative CPU time taken
for verifying the properties by Tahrir using the CVC3 engine is 6.27 minutes. It takes 7.25
minutes to accomplish the same task using the UCLID engine. The maximum memory
consumption is 157.5 MB and 171.2 MB during the two runs respectively.
Figure 4.4 has two plots that show the CPU runtime and memory consumed in veri-
fying each property during the two runs. The plotted data include the time and memory
consumed in generating and optimizing the automata. These data also include the time































Figure 4.4: CPU time and memory consumption: CVC3 (Top) and UCLID (Bottom)
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In the plots shown in figure 4.4, the properties are categorized based on the number
of inner quantifiers (NIQ) used in their proof statements. Based on the plotted data,
properties with relatively higher NIQs tend to consume more resources during verification.
This is not surprising because the inner quantifiers appear in the final formula which gets
sent to the decision engine. Hence, a higher number of quantifiers would possibly lead to
more variable instantiations and consequently increase the amount of resources consumed
in determining the falsifiability of the formula.
4.6 Summary
Tahrir, a tool that uses an SMT solver as a decision engine, is implemented to verify
SSLTL properties inductively. Tahrir is used to verify inter-instruction dependencies in
a processor modeled with an abstract datapath. The processor model supports out-of-
order speculative execution of instructions. The instrumentation predicates are defined in
terms of the variables of the model. The inter-instruction correctness is instantiated into
14 obligations and 26 consistency conditions. The total number of properties verified is
83 (including 43 lemmas for strengthening the induction). Verification takes less than 8




Our thesis contributions can be summarized in two main points:
1. Introducing an inductive approach for verifying SSLTL properties: in our approach,
the target SSLTL property is transformed into an invariant which can be then checked
by induction using an SMT solver or an invariant checker. Our approach is shown to
be sound and complete with respect to the standard definition of LTL correctness.
2. Presenting a strategy for verifying whether a pipelined microprocessor preserves data
and control dependencies among instructions: in our strategy, data and control de-
pendencies are treated uniformly. Our top-level correctness criteria are decomposed
into a set of safety properties that allow flexible forms of speculative out-of-order
execution of instructions.
Chapter 2 presents an algorithmic view of our approach for verifying SSLTL properties
by k-step induction. The main function Verify takes (among other inputs) a model M
and an SSLTL property p, and returns true if and only if the M satisfies p. It also takes
a number k representing the depth of the induction and a Boolean expression e to use in
strengthening the inductive invariant.
Function Verify starts by translating the property p into an automaton Bp. The trans-
lation is an implementation of the basic Büchi automata construction algorithm with the
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exception that all the states of the constructed automaton are considered accepting states.
The automaton Bp is transformed to a model Mp by encoding its states as Boolean vari-
ables. An invariant ep (written in terms of these variables) is built to describe the states
and transitions of Bp. The augmented model Ma is formed by adding Mp to the original
model M .
Function Verify then checks whether the augmented model Ma satisfies the invariant
ep using k-step induction. During induction, the invariant is strengthened using e to
limit unreachable states. A value of true is returned by function Verify if and only if the
induction shows that the augmented model Mp satisfies the strengthened invariant ep ∧ e
for the given values of e and k.
Our approach for SSLTL verification is proven to be sound and complete. The core
of the proof is theorem 2.1 which is used to show that applying our SSLTL verification
algorithm (represented by function Verify) on a model M and an SSLTL property is
equivalent to verifying that M satisfies p.
Chapter 3 explains how we specify that a microprocessor handles dependencies between
instructions correctly. In our correctness definitions, we describe the way instructions
should interact with the state variables of the microprocessor as well as with each other.
We present the correctness in the context of generic pipelines where instructions are referred
to as parcels.
The state of the pipeline is captured by a set of physical variables. These physical vari-
ables can be statically or dynamically mapped to architectural variables. Parcels interact
with the state of the pipeline by reading from and/or writing to the physical variables.
A parcel can make an arbitrary number of reads from and/or writes to physical variables
that are mapped to the same architectural variable. All but final reads and writes are
considered speculative and hence do not affect the final results of a parcel.
A pipeline is instrumented with a parcel identification mechanism and some predicates
to monitor parcel activities. Predicates such as Top and Infl probe the phase of a parcel at
any given state. Predicates such as Rd and Wr mark the interactions between a parcel and
the variables of the pipeline. History information about these interactions are captured
by predicates such as MRWr and PWr. Different types of inter-parcel dependencies are
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identified by predicates such as DDep and NoDep.
Using this instrumentation, inter-parcel correctness is expressed in the form of two prop-
erties that support speculative out-of-order processing of parcels: PropProdCons and
PropNoProd. PropProdCons describes the interaction between any two parcels where
the leading parcel produces a data to be consumed by the trailing parcel. PropNoProd
addresses the case in which a parcel consumes a data that is not produced by any leading
parcel.
Due to their temporal complexity, properties PropProdCons and PropNoProd are
decomposed into 4 obligations and 14 consistency conditions. The purpose of the obliga-
tions is to detect bugs in the implementation. The consistency conditions ensure that the
definitions of the instrumentation predicates are correct. The decomposition is proven to
be sound.
Chapter 4 describes a case study that we conducted to illustrate our verification tech-
niques (presented in chapters 2 and 3) and evaluate their effectiveness. Tahrir, a tool that
uses an SMT solver as a decision engine, is developed to verify SSLTL properties about
term-level models inductively. Tahrir implements the algorithm given by function Verify .
The verification is guided by proof statements specifying assumptions about the model and
lemmas to keep induction within reachable states.
Tahrir is used to verify inter-instruction dependencies in a processor modeled with an
abstract datapath. The processor model supports out-of-order speculative execution of
instructions. The architectural variables in the model are a program counter (PC) and a
register file (RF). The model uses a register alias table (RAT) and a reorder buffer (ROB)
to implement register renaming. The ROB is also used for bookkeeping and for exchanging
(forwarding) data between in-flight instructions. Instructions can also exchange data using
a bypass register (RBSD).
The parcel-based instrumentation technique is applied to the model. Parcels (instruc-
tions) are identified by ROB indices. The instrumentation predicates are defined in terms of
the model variables in addition to a few history variables. The inter-instruction correctness
is instantiated into 14 obligations and 26 consistency conditions. This instantiation relies
on manually specifying which physical variables in the model are architecturally visible.
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The total number of properties verified in our case study is 83. This number includes 43
lemmas that are introduced to strengthen the induction. Tahrir takes less than 8 minutes
and consumes less than 200MB of memory in verifying the properties. Our results show
some correlation between the number of inner quantifier (NIQ) variables used in the proof
statement of a property and the resources consumed in verifying that property. Properties
with higher NIQ tend to take longer time and/or consume more memory to verify.
In formulating the correctness criteria and decompositions, our goal was to make the
criteria as general as possible. For example, in our case study, we were able to use the same
correctness criteria for both the program counter and register file (i.e., for both control
and data dependencies). However, further evaluation on a wider range of pipelines will be
necessary to validate the true generality of our criteria and strategy.
Our plan for future research is four-fold: (1) evaluate the generality of our inter-parcel
verification strategy, (2) extend its applicability, (3) boost the performance of our SSLTL
verification tool (Tahrir), and (4) enhance its usability.
To evaluate the generality of our inter-parcel verification strategy, we will apply our
strategy to microprocessor models that support optimizations that are not covered in our
case study such as exceptions and value prediction. We will also conduct case studies
focused on other types of pipelined systems, i.e., non-processor pipelines such as those
used in image and/or video processing.
To extend its applicability, we will combine our strategy with a mechanism for automatic
datapath abstraction such as the one proposed by Ciubotario [9]. This will allow us to
tackle more concrete models of microprocessors, i.e., bit-level models as opposed to term-
level models similar to the one verified in our case study.
To boost tool’s performance, we will replace the current system-call-based interface at
the core of Tahrir with an API-based interface. We believe a tighter coupling between
Tahrir and its decision engine would enhance overall performance. We will also imple-
ment a more efficient algorithm for generating Büchi automata such as those developed by
Couvreur [14], Gastin et al. [17], and Latvala [37].
To enhance the tool’s usability, we will provide Tahrir with a capability that helps the
user come up with the invariants. To do so, we will explore the existing techniques for
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automatic generation of invariants such as those presented by Bensalem et al. [4].
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